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Abstract
To what extent and in what form should the intellectual property rights (IPR) of innovators
be protected? Should a company with a large technology lead over its rivals receive the
same IPR protection as a company with a more limited advantage? The analysis of these
questions necessitates a dynamic framework for the study of the interactions between IPR
and competition, in particular to understand the impact of such policies on future incentives.
In this paper, we develop such a framework. The economy consists of many industries and
rms engaged in cumulative (step-by-step) innovation. IPR policy regulates whether followers
in an industry can copy (or license or build upon) the technology of the leader. With full
patent protection, followers can catch up to the leader in their industry only by making the
same innovation(s) themselves (or by full licensing). We prove the existence of a steady-
state equilibrium in a baseline environment and characterize some of its properties. We then
quantitatively investigate the implications of di¤erent types of IPR policy on the equilibrium
growth rate and welfare. The most important result from this exercise is that full patent
protection is not optimal (welfare maximizing); instead, optimal policy involves state-dependent
IPR protection, providing greater protection to technology leaders that are further ahead than
those that are close to their followers. This form of the optimal policy results from the impact
of policy on dynamic incentives, in particular from a form of trickle-downe¤ect: providing
greater protection to rms that are further ahead of their followers than a certain threshold
increases the R&D incentives also for all technology leaders that are less advanced than this
threshold.
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1 Introduction
What is the optimal extent and form of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection? Should
a rm with a large technology lead receive the same IPR protection as a company with a
more limited technological lead, or should IPR policy be coupled with antitrust and used to
limit the monopoly power of technology leaders? Despite broad consensus that innovation is
central to the long-run performance of an economy, there is no consensus on the answers to
such questions. A large literature on IPR (discussed below) focuses on the static trade-o¤s
between the positive incentive benets of IPR protection and its costs in terms of reducing
competition and increasing markups. In this paper, we argue that dynamic trade-o¤s between
IPR protection and competition, which have so far been overlooked, may be equally or more
important for developing answers to these questions.
These issues and the importance of these questions are highlighted by several recent high-
prole cases.1 For example, motivated by antitrust concerns, a recent ruling of the European
Commission ordered Microsoft to share secret information about its operating system and
products with other software companies (New York Times, December 22, 2004). Similar issues
were also central to the US Department of Justice (DOJ) case against Microsoft, which started
on May 18th, 1998 and ultimately resulted in a ruling against Microsoft. Figures 1 and 2 show
the evolution of R&D by Microsoft and by other top 10 publicly traded R&D investors in the
IT sector relative to the sector average before and after the start of the DOJ case.2
[Figure 1 & 2 here]
The relative R&D spending by Microsoft and other industry leaders, which had been
steadily perhaps even exponentially increasing since the mid-80s, appear to decline after
the DOJ action. While one might expect R&D by Microsoft to slow down for a variety of
reasons, it is not obvious why there should be a relative decline in the R&D of other top
companies, since they partly beneted from the weakening of, and the restrictions imposed on,
Microsoft. This relative decline may have been caused by a slowdown in the R&D activities
of these other companies or an increase in the R&D investments of smaller IT rms (or by
1 In addition to the Microsoft case, the issue of technological lead has been central in the Department of
Justice investigations of Intel (New York Times, May 11, 2009) and the debates about Googles market share
(New York Times, February 21, 2009).
2All data are from COMPUSTAT. Top 10 rms is determined by the highest 10 R&D investors (except
Microsoft) in 1995. The patterns shown in Figures 1 and 2 are very similar if we use in that top 10 investors in
2000 or 1990, or if we benchmark it to the median of the industry rather than the mean. Top 10 investors in
Figure 2 are: CA Inc, Continuum Inc, Intergraph Corp, Sterling Software Inc, Oracle Inc, Adobe Inc, Symantec
Corp, Electronic Arts Inc, Sybase Inc, Intuit Inc.
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entirely di¤erent and unrelated factors). To investigate these issues more systematically, we
need a dynamic equilibrium framework where R&D activities of di¤erent types of rms might
be a¤ected by a change in IPR and competition policy.
Our framework builds on and extends the step-by-step innovation models of Aghion, Harris
and Vickers (1997) and Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001), where a number of (typi-
cally two) rms engage in price competition within an industry and undertake R&D in order
to improve their production technology. The technology gap between the rms determines
the extent of the monopoly power of the leader, and hence the price markups and prots.
The purpose of R&D by the follower is to catch up and surpass the leader (as in standard
Schumpeterian models of innovation, e.g., Reinganum, 1981, 1985, Aghion and Howitt, 1992,
Grossman and Helpman, 1991), while the purpose of R&D by the leader is to escape the
competition of the follower and increase its markup and prots. Despite the dynamic nature
of these models, their policy implications are still mostly based on the same static trade-o¤
mentioned above. For this reason, for example, Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001,
p. 481) conjecture that IPR protection should be limited and particularly so for rms with
larger technological leads over their rivals (which face less competition and thus have greater
monopoly power).
We extend these existing models in several directions. Most importantly, we explicitly
introduce state-dependent patent/IPR protection policy, meaning a policy that makes the
extent of patent or intellectual property rights protection conditional on the technology gap
between di¤erent rms in the industry. As in racing-type models in general (e.g., Harris and
Vickers, 1985, 1987, Budd, Harris and Vickers, 1993), a large gap between the leader and
the follower discourages R&D by both. Consequently, overall R&D and technological progress
are greater when the technology gap between the leader and the follower is relatively small.3
One may then expect that full patent protection may be suboptimal in a world of step-by-
step competition and permitting followers to copy or use the leaderstechnologies would be
particularly benecial in industries where there is a large technology gap between leaders and
followers.4 However, crucially, this reasoning ignores the dynamic incentive e¤ects, which are
our main focus in this paper and emerge more clearly when IPR policy is explicitly state-
dependent.
Our analysis establishes that the opposite of the above conjecture is always true in such
3Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Gri¢ th and Howitt (2005) provide empirical evidence from British industries
consistent with the view R&D increases when there is a smaller technological gap between rms. See also
Aghion and Gri¢ th (2007).
4This is indeed the basis of Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickerss conjecture.
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a dynamic equilibrium framework: optimal IPR policy should provide greater protection to
technologically more advanced leaders. Underlying this result is what we refer to as the trickle-
down of incentives: providing relatively low protection to rms with limited leads and greater
protection to those that have greater leads not only improves the incentives of rms that are
technologically advanced, but also encourages R&D by those that have limited leads because
of the prospect of reaching levels of technology gaps associated with greater protection. A
corollary of this result is that full IPR protection is not optimal, and there should be limited
(but state-dependent) IPR protection for rms with only limited technology leads over their
rivals.
More specically, we show that in contrast to the standard disincentive e¤ects of uniform
relaxation of IPR policy, state-dependent relaxation that provides greater protection to tech-
nologically more advanced rms creates a positive incentive e¤ect. This is because when a
particular state for the technology leader (say being n steps ahead of the follower) becomes
more protable, this increases the incentives to perform R&D not only for leaders that are
n   1 steps ahead, but for all leaders with a lead of size n  n   1. It is this trickle-down
e¤ect that generates the positive incentive e¤ect and makes state-dependent IPR, with greater
protection for rms that are technologically more advanced than their rivals, preferable to
uniform IPR.
We start with a partial equilibrium model, which under some simplifying assumptions al-
lows an explicit characterization of the trickle-down e¤ect. We then provide a richer dynamic
general equilibrium framework which allows a variety of di¤erent assumptions on how inno-
vation depends on R&D by technology leaders and followers. Our baseline model focuses on
quick catch-up, meaning that a follower can catch up with the technology leader with a single
innovation regardless of the size of the gap between them. For this environment, we establish
the existence of a stationary equilibrium and characterize some of its properties. We then
study the form of optimal (welfare maximizing) IPR and competition policy quantitatively.
The same e¤ects as in the partial equilibrium analysis make state-dependent relaxation of IPR
optimal. Quantitatively, we nd that optimal state-dependent IPR policy can increase the
growth rate of the economy from 1.86% to 2.04%, and does so with fewer workers employed
in the R&D sector (because R&D workers are reallocated towards rms where their e¤orts
directly lead to productivity growth). In contrast, uniform relaxation of IPR policy reduces
both welfare and growth. These patterns are quite robust to di¤erent parameter values.
We next show how the framework can be extended to study these issues under alternative
assumptions, in particular, assuming slow catch-up so that followers close the gap between
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themselves and technology leaders only gradually. The presence of slow catch-up also enables
us to introduce di¤erent types of R&D e¤orts and di¤erent dimensions of IPR policy, in
particular, licensing and patent infringement fees.5 We show that the trickle-down e¤ect and
the result that optimal IPR policy should be state-dependent and provide greater protection
to technologically more advanced rms are robust in these alternative environments. In most
cases, optimal IPR policy also increases growth by a similar magnitude to our baseline model
(though in some cases, it increases welfare but not necessarily growth).6
Our paper is a contribution both to the IPR protection and the endogenous growth lit-
eratures. Previous work has focused on the static trade-o¤ between ex-post monopoly rents
and ex-ante R&D incentives (e.g., Arrow, 1962, Reinganum, 1981, Tirole, 1988, Romer, 1990,
Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Aghion and Howitt, 1992, Green and Scotchmer, 1995, Scotch-
mer, 1999, Gallini and Scotchmer, 2002, ODonoghue and Zweimuller, 2004).7 Much of the
literature discusses the trade-o¤ between these two forces to determine the optimal length and
breadth of patents. For example, Klemperer (1990) and Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) show that
optimal patents should have a long duration in order to provide inducement to R&D, but a
narrow breadth so as to limit monopoly distortions. A number of other papers, for example,
Gallini (1992) and Gallini and Scotchmer (2002), reach opposite conclusions.
Another branch of the literature, including the seminal paper by Scotchmer (1999) and
the recent interesting papers by Llobet, Hopenhayn and Mitchell (2006) and Hopenhayn and
Mitchell (2001, 2011), adopts a mechanism design approach to the determination of the optimal
patent and intellectual property rights protection system. For example, Scotchmer (1999)
derives the patent renewal system as an optimal mechanism in an environment where the cost
and value of di¤erent projects are unobserved and the main problem is to decide which projects
should go ahead. Llobet, Hopenhayn and Mitchell (2006) consider optimal patent policy in the
context of a model of sequential innovation with heterogeneous quality and private information.
They show that allowing for a choice from a menu of patents will be optimal in this context.
5 In particular, in this regime, we allow rms to undertake frontier as well as catch-up R&D. With frontier
R&D, they can build on the technology leaders knowledge base and, if successful, they immediately surpass the
leader, but might be liable for a patent infringement fee.
We also allow followers to license the innovation of the technology leader by paying a prespecied license
fee i.e., a compulsory licensing where the license fee is determined by IPR policy. We also show that
voluntary licensing agreements would not achieve the same results, so our analysis establishes a potential need
for compulsory licensing policy. Previous work emphasizing importance of compulsory licensing includes Tandon
(1982), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), and Kremer (2002). See Moser and Voena (2011) for a recent empirical
investigation.
6We also show that both licensing and the possibility of frontier R&D (subject to infringement fees) con-
tributes to growth and welfare.
7Boldrin and Levine (2004, 2008) or Quah (2003) argue that patent systems are not necessary for innovation.
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Hopenhayn and Mitchell (2011) build on an earlier version of our paper, Acemoglu and Akcigit
(2006), and derive a form of trickle-down e¤ect using a mechanism design approach in a model
with recurring innovations.
Our paper also extends Aghion, Harris and Vickers (1997) and Aghion, Harris, Howitt
and Vickers (2001).8 Although our model builds on these papers, it also di¤ers from them
in a number of signicant ways. First and most importantly, we introduce state-dependent
IPR policy. Second, we also introduce and analyze the slow catch-up regime, and in this
context, we allow for compulsory licensing and for leapfrogging, which makes the followers
directly contribute to the economic growth. We provide a full quantitative analysis of state-
dependent IPR policy under these di¤erent scenarios. Third, our economy is a full general
equilibrium model with competition between production and R&D for scarce labor.9 Finally,
we provide a general existence result and a number of analytical results for the general model
(with or without IPR policy), while previous literature has focused on the special cases where
innovations are either drastic(so that the leader never undertakes R&D) or very small, and
has not provided existence or general characterization results for steady-state equilibria.
Lastly, our results are also related to the literature on tournaments and races, for example,
Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz and Tirole (1983), Harris and Vickers (1985, 1987), Choi (1991),
Budd, Harris and Vickers (1993), Taylor (1995), Fullerton and McAfee (1999), Baye and Hoppe
(2003), and Moscarini and Squintani (2004). This literature considers the impact of endogenous
or exogenous prizes on e¤ort in tournaments, races or R&D contests. In terms of this literature,
state-dependent IPR policy can be thought of as state-dependent handicappingof di¤erent
players (where the state variable is the gap between the two players in a dynamic tournament).
To the best of our knowledge, these types of schemes have not been considered in this literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the partial equilibrium
model and analytically demonstrates the trickle-down e¤ect. Section 3 presents our baseline
environment (where a successful innovation by followers closes the entire gap with technol-
ogy leaders in one step, i.e., there is quick catch-up). Section 4 proves the existence of a
steady-state equilibrium and characterizes some of its key properties under both uniform and
state-dependent IPR policy. Section 5 denes the social welfare objective and outlines our
8Segal and Whinston (2007) analyze the impact of anti-trust policy on economic growth in a related model
of step-by-step innovation.
9This general equilibrium aspect is introduced to be able to close the model economy without unrealistic
assumptions and makes our economy more comparable to other growth models (Aghion, Harris, Howit and
Vickers, 2001, assume a perfectly elastic supply of labor). We show that the presence of general equilibrium
interactions does not signicantly complicate the analysis and it is still possible to characterize the steady-state
equilibrium.
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quantitative methods. Section 6 characterizes the structure of optimal IPR policy quantita-
tively. Section 7 extends the model to allow for slow catch-up, compulsory license fees and
leapfrogging, and quantitatively characterizes the structure of optimal IPR policy under dif-
ferent combinations of these policies. Section 8 concludes, while the Appendix contains the
proofs of all the results stated in the text.
2 A Partial Equilibrium Illustration
We rst illustrate the main economic force in this paper, the trickle-down e¤ect, using a partial
equilibrium model. Consider the following innite horizon, step-by-step R&D race between two
competing rms in continuous time. Each rm maximizes the expected net present discounted
value of net prots,dened as operating prot minus R&D cost,
Et
Z 1
t
exp ( r (s  t)) [i (s)  i (s)] ds;
where Et denotes expectation at time t, r > 0 is the interest rate, i (t) is the instantaneous
operating prot ow and i (t) represents the R&D cost of rm i at time t. In this game, rm
i 2 f1; 2g invests in R&D to advance its position relative to its rival i0 6= i. Suppose that the
positions of both rms in this race can be characterized by integer values on the real line, and
denote the distance of rm i from its rival at time t by ni (t). In the partial equilibrium model,
we simplify the analysis by following Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001) and Aghion,
Bloom, Blundell, Gri¢ th and Howitt (2005) in assuming that the maximum technology gap
between a leader and a follower is 2; this assumption is relaxed in the full general equilibrium
model analyzed in the rest of the paper. For now it simplies the analysis by ensuring that
the relative position of rm i can take ve possible values, ni (t) 2 NI  f 2; 1; 0; 1; 2g. Let
us denote the absolute gap between the rms by n (t)  max fni (t) ; n i (t)g, and suppress the
time subscripts to simplify notation.
The payo¤s in this game are assumed to be stationary and only a function of the relative
distance between the rms, thus represented by  : NI ! R+ (see equation (20) in Section 3).
Here ni  0 is simply the instantaneous payo¤ that rm i obtains when its distance from its
competitor is ni at time t and assumed to be a strictly increasing function of ni. To advance
its relative position, rm i invests in R&D, which determines the Poisson rate of arrival of
innovation, xi 2 R+. Let us also assume that the cost of R&D is linear in the arrival rate
of innovation, i.e.,  (xi) = xi; with  > 0 (again see below for more general formulations).
Each successful innovation is patented and advances rm is state (relative position) by one
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step, so that following a successful innovation by rm i at time t we have: ni (t+) = ni (t) + 1
(where ni (t+) stands for ni immediately following time t).
IPR policy governs the expected length of a patent. For simplicity, we model patent length
by assuming that it terminates at a Poisson rate. Crucially for our focus, IPR policy is state
dependent, and we represent it by the function:  : NI! R+: Here  (n)  n <1 is the ow
rate at which the patent terminates (patent protection is removed) for a technology leader that
is n steps ahead. When n = 0, this implies that there is full protection at technology gap n,
in the sense that patent protection will never be removed. In contrast, n ! 1 implies that
patent protection is removed immediately once technology gap n is reached. When the patent
protection is removed, the rm that is behind copies the technology of its competitor and both
rms end up neck-and-neck, i.e., n = 0.
Finally, we take the interest rate r as exogenous and assume that it satises r <
(n   n 1) =4 for each n 2 NI. This assumption ensures positive R&D by each rm when
n = 0. Throughout we will focus on (stationary) Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE), where
strategies (R&D decisions) are only functions of the payo¤-relevant state, which is n 2 NI. A
more formal denition of the MPE in the general equilibrium environment is given below.
The MPE can be characterized by writing the value functions of each rm as a function of
the state n 2 NI. These value functions are given by the following recursions:
rv2 = 2 + x 2 [v1   v2] + 2 [v0   v2] ; (1)
rv1 = max
x10
f1   x1 + x1 [v2   v1] + x 1 [v0   v1] + 1 [v0   v1]g ; (2)
rv0 = max
x00
f0   x0 + x0 [v1   v0] + ~x0 [v 1   v0]g ; (3)
rv 1 = max
x 10
f 1   x 1 + x 1 [v0   v 1] + x1 [v 2   v 1] + 1 [v0   v 1]g ; (4)
rv 2 = max
x 20
f 2   x 2 + x 2 [v 1   v 2] + 2 [v0   v 2]g : (5)
In all equations, the rst term represents current prots. In equations (2)-(5), the second term
substracts R&D costs from current prots, the third term represents the fact that the rm will
successfully innovate at the ow rate xn and increase its position by one step. The fourth term
incorporates the change in value due to an innovation by the rival rm. In equations (1) and (2)
the last term is the change in value for the leader due to patent expiration, which takes place
at the rate n, while in (4) and (5) is the change in value for the follower. Finally, equation (3)
has the same interpretation except that now n = 0 and the two rms are neck-and-neck and
thus there is no IPR policy (and the ow rate of innovation of the other rm is denoted by ~x0,
and naturally, in a symmetric equilibrium, we will have x0 = ~x0). Note also that in equations
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(1) and (5), we used the fact that a two-step ahead rm does not undertake any R&D since it
has already achieved the maximum feasible lead.
We will now characterize the MPE under two di¤erent policy environments: uniform and
state-dependent IPR policy.
Uniform IPR Policy. Uniform IPR policy corresponds to the case where n =  <
1. Consequently, optimal R&D decisions in equations (2)-(5) can be solved out as (see the
Appendix):
x 2 = max

 4 + 2    2

  4r; 0

; x 1 = max

 3 + 1    2

  3r; 0

;
x0 = max

 2 + 0    2

  2r; 0

; and x1 = max

  +  1    2

  r; 0

:
Inspection of these expressions immediately establishes the following result:
Proposition 1 Under uniform IPR policy regime, any relaxation of IPR policy (away from
 = 0) creates a disincentive e¤ectand reduces all R&D levels.
State-dependent IPR Policy. We next consider state-dependent policy where the patent
protection of a technology leader depends on the technology gap, n. Optimal R&D decisions
can now be written out as (see the Appendix):
x 2 = max

 42 +
2    2

  4r; 0

; x 1 = max

 1   22 +
1    2

  3r; 0

;
x0 = max

 22 +
0    2

  2r; 0

; and x1 = max

1   22 +
 1    2

  r; 0

:
Inspection of these expressions shows that, in contrast to the uniform IPR case, relaxing
patent protection can increase the R&D e¤ort of the one-step leader, x1. In particular, this
can be accomplished by providing a lower protection in the current state (higher 1) and/or a
higher protection upon a successful innovation (lower 2).
Proposition 2 Under state-dependent IPR policy regime, relaxing IPR policy (away from
n = 0) by weakening current protection (i.e., increasing 1) creates a positive incentive
e¤ectand increases x1.
Whether optimal IPR policy will involve 1 > 0 and/or 2 > 0 now depends on the social
returns from xns. For example, if x1 is socially more benecial than x 1, 1 > 0 will always
be preferred. In the context of our general equilibrium model, this will always be the case.
Proposition 2 provides a preview of these results.
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3 General Equilibrium Framework
We now describe our baseline dynamic general equilibrium model. To maximize continuity
with the previous literature and to provide the sharpest theoretical characterization results,
our baseline model assumes quick catch-up, meaning that one innovation by a follower is suf-
cient to close the gap with the technology leader in the industry. The characterization of
the equilibrium in this environment under the di¤erent policy regimes is presented in the next
section. Alternative assumptions on the form of catch-up are investigated in Section 7.
3.1 Preferences and Technology
Consider the following continuous time economy with a unique nal good. The economy is
populated by a continuum of 1 individuals, each with 1 unit of labor endowment, which they
supply inelastically. Preferences at time t are given by
Et
Z 1
t
exp (  (s  t)) logC (s) ds; (6)
where Et denotes expectations at time t,  > 0 is the discount rate and C (t) is consumption
at date t. The logarithmic preferences in (6) facilitate the analysis, since they imply a simple
relationship between the interest rate, growth rate and the discount rate (see (7) below).
Let Y (t) be the total production of the nal good at time t. We assume that the economy
is closed and the nal good is used only for consumption (i.e., there is no investment), so that
C (t) = Y (t). The standard Euler equation from (6) then implies that
g (t) 
_C (t)
C (t)
=
_Y (t)
Y (t)
= r (t)  ; (7)
where this equation denes g (t) as the growth rate of consumption and thus output, and r (t)
is the interest rate at date t.
The nal good Y is produced using a continuum 1 of intermediate goods according to the
Cobb-Douglas production function
lnY (t) =
Z 1
0
ln y (j; t) dj; (8)
where y (j; t) is the output of jth intermediate at time t. Throughout, we take the price of the
nal good as the numeraire and denote the price of intermediate j at time t by p (j; t). We
also assume that there is free entry into the nal good production sector. These assumptions,
together with the Cobb-Douglas production function (8), imply that the nal good sector has
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the following demand for intermediates
y (j; t) =
Y (t)
p (j; t)
; 8j 2 [0; 1] : (9)
Intermediate j 2 [0; 1] comes in two di¤erent varieties, each produced by one of two
innitely-lived rms. We assume that these two varieties are perfect substitutes and these
rms compete a la Bertrand.10 Firm i = 1 or 2 in industry j has the following technology
y (j; t) = qi (j; t) li (j; t) (10)
where li (j; t) is the employment level of the rm and qi (j; t) is its level of technology at
time t. Each consumer in the economy holds a balanced portfolio of the shares of all rms.
Consequently, the objective function of each rm is to maximize expected prots.
The production function for intermediate goods, (10), implies that the marginal cost of
producing intermediate j for rm i at time t is
MCi (j; t) =
w (t)
qi (j; t)
(11)
where w (t) is the wage rate in the economy at time t.
When this causes no confusion, we denote the technology leader in each industry by i and
the follower by  i, so that we have:
qi (j; t)  q i (j; t) :
Bertrand competition between the two rms implies that all intermediates will be supplied by
the leader at the limitprice:11
pi (j; t) =
w (t)
q i (j; t)
: (12)
Equation (9) then implies the following demand for intermediates:
y (j; t) =
q i (j; t)
w (t)
Y (t) : (13)
10A more general case would involve these two varieties being imperfect substitutes, for example, with the
output of intermediate j produced as
y (j; t) =
h
'y1 (j; t)
 1
 + (1  ') y2 (j; t)
 1

i 
 1
;
with  > 1. The model analyzed in the text corresponds to the limiting case where  !1. Our results can be
easily extended to this more general case with any  > 1, but at the cost of additional notation. We therefore
prefer to focus on the case where the two varieties are perfect substitutes. It is nonetheless useful to bear this
formulation with imperfect substitutes in mind, since it facilitates the interpretation of distinct innovations
by the two rms (when the follower engages in catch-upR&D).
11 If the leader were to charge a higher price, then the market would be captured by the follower earning
positive prots. A lower price can always be increased while making sure that all nal good producers still
prefer the intermediate supplied by the leader i rather than that by the follower  i, even if the latter were
supplied at marginal cost. Since the monopoly price with the unit elastic demand curve is innite, the leader
always gains by increasing its price, making the price given in (12) the unique equilibrium price.
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3.2 Technology, R&D and IPR Policy under Quick Catch-up
R&D by the leader or the follower stochastically leads to innovation. We assume that when
the leader innovates, its technology improves by a factor  > 1.
The follower, on the other hand, can undertake R&D to catch up with the frontier tech-
nology. We will call this type of R&D as catch-up R&D.12 Catch-up R&D can be thought of
R&D to discover an alternative way of performing the same task as the current leading-edge
technology. Because this innovation applies to the followers variant of the product (recall
footnote 10) and results from its own R&D e¤orts, we assume in our baseline framework that
it does not constitute infringement on the patent of the leader.13
R&D by the leader and follower may have di¤erent costs and success probabilities. We
simplify the analysis by assuming that both types of R&D have the same costs and the same
probability of success. In particular, in all cases, we assume that innovations follow a controlled
Poisson process, with the arrival rate determined by R&D investments. Each rm (in every
industry) has access to the following R&D technology:
xi (j; t) = F (hi (j; t)) ; (14)
where xi (j; t) is the ow rate of innovation at time t and hi (j; t) is the number of workers
hired by rm i in industry j to work in the R&D process at t. This specication implies that
within a time interval of t, the probability of innovation for this rm is xi (j; t) t+ o (t).
We assume that F is twice continuously di¤erentiable and satises F 0 () > 0; F 00 () < 0,
F 0 (0) < 1 and that there exists h 2 (0;1) such that F 0 (h) = 0 for all h  h. The
assumption that F 0 (0) < 1 implies that there is no Inada condition when hi (j; t) = 0. The
last assumption, on the other hand, ensures that there is an upper bound on the ow rate of
innovation (which is not essential but simplies the proofs). Recalling that the wage rate for
labor is w (t), the cost for R&D is therefore w (t)G (xi (j; t)) where
G (xi (j; t))  F 1 (xi (j; t)) ; (15)
and the assumptions on F immediately imply that G is twice continuously di¤erentiable and
satises G0 () > 0; G00 () > 0, G0 (0) > 0 and limx!xG0 (x) =1, where
x  F  h (16)
12This contrasts with frontier R&D introduced in Section 7, which will allow the follower to leapfrog the
leader.
13We allow for infringement in Section 7.
11
is the maximal ow rate of innovation (with h dened above).
We next describe the evolution of technologies within each industry. Suppose that leader i
in industry j at time t has a technology level of
qi (j; t) = 
nij(t); (17)
and that the follower  is technology at time t is
q i (j; t) = n ij(t); (18)
where nij (t)  n ij (t) and nij (t), n ij (t) 2 Z+ denote the technology rungs of the leader and
the follower in industry j. We refer to nj (t)  nij (t) n ij (t) as the technology gap in industry
j. If the leader undertakes an innovation within a time interval of t, then its technology
increases to qi (j; t+ t) = nijt+1 and the technology gap rises to nj (t+ t) = nj (t) + 1
(the probability of two or more innovations within the interval t will be o (t), where o (t)
represents terms that satisfy limt!0 o (t) =t).
In our baseline model, we assume that there is quick catch-up between followers and leaders.
Namely, when the follower is successful in catch-up R&D within the interval t, then its
technology improves to
q i (j; t+ t) = nijt ;
and thus it catches up with the leader immediately (regardless of how large the technology
gap was). In this case, the technology gap variable becomes njt+t = 0 upon a successful
innovation by the follower.14
In addition to catching up with the technology frontier with their own R&D, followers can
also copy the technology frontier because IPR policy is such that some patents expire. In
particular, we assume that patents expire at some policy-determined Poisson rate , and after
expiration, followers can costlessly copy the frontier technology, jumping to q i (j; t+ t) =
nijt .15 As in the partial equilibrium model in Section 2, IPR policy governs the length of the
patent and we allow it to be state dependent, so it is represented by the following function:
 : N! R+
Here  (n)  n < 1 is the ow rate at which the patent protection is removed from a
technology leader that is n steps ahead of the follower. When n = 0, this implies that there is
14 In Section 7, we will replace this assumption with slow catch-up where one innovation enables the follower
to proceed by one step.
15Alternative modeling assumptions on IPR policy, such as a xed patent length of T > 0 from the time
of innovation, are not tractable, since they lead to value functions that take the form of delayed di¤erential
equations.
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full protection at technology gap n, in the sense that patent protection will never be removed.
In contrast, n ! 1 implies that patent protection is removed immediately once technology
gap n is reached. Our formulation imposes that  f1; 2; :::g is time-invariant. Given this
specication, we can now write the law of motion of the technology gap in industry j as follows:
nj (t+ t) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
nj (t) + 1
0
nj (t)
with probability
with probability
with probability
xi (j; t) t+ o (t)
x i (j; t) + nj(t)

t+ o (t)
1 

xi (j; t) + x i (j; t) + nj(t)

t  o (t))
:
(19)
Here o (t) again represents second-order terms, in particular, the probabilities of more than
one innovations within an interval of length t. The terms xi (j; t) and x i (j; t) are the ow
rates of innovation by the leader and the follower; and nj(t) is the ow rate at which the
follower is allowed to copy the technology of a leader that is nj (t) steps ahead. Intuitively, the
technology gap in industry j increases from nj (t) to nj (t) + 1 if the leader is successful. The
rms become neck-and-neckwhen the follower comes up with an alternative technology to
that of the leader (ow rate x i (j; t)) or the patent expires at the ow rate nj :
3.3 Prots
We next write the instantaneous operatingprots for the leader (i.e., the prots exclusive
of R&D expenditures). Prots of leader i in industry j at time t are
i (j; t) = [pi (j; t) MCi (j; t)] yi (j; t)
=

w (t)
q i (j; t)
  w (t)
qi (j; t)

Y (t)
pi (j; t)
=

1   nj(t)

Y (t) (20)
where nj (t)  nij (t) n ij (t) is the technology gap in industry j at time t. The rst line simply
uses the denition of operating prots as price minus marginal cost times quantity sold. The
second line uses the fact that the equilibrium limit price of rm i is pi (j; t) = w (t) =q i (j; t)
as given by (12), and the nal equality uses the denitions of qi (j; t) and q i (j; t) from (17)
and (18). The expression in (20) also implies that there will be zero prots in neck-and-neck
industries, i.e., in those with nj (t) = 0. Also clearly, followers always make zero prots, since
they have no sales.
The Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function in (8) is responsible for the form of the
prots (20), since it implies that prots only depend on the technology gap of the industry
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and aggregate output. This will simplify the analysis below by making the technology gap in
each industry the only industry-specic payo¤-relevant state variable.
The objective function of each rm is to maximize the net present discounted value of net
prots (operating prots minus R&D expenditures). In doing this, each rm will take the
sequence of interest rates, [r (t)]t0, the sequence of aggregate output levels, [Y (t)]t0, the
sequence of wages, [w (t)]t0, the R&D decisions of all other rms and policies as given.
3.4 Equilibrium
Let  (t)fn (t)g1n=0 denote the distribution of industries over di¤erent technology gaps, withP1
n=0 n (t) = 1. For example, 0 (t) denotes the fraction of industries in which the rms are
neck-and-neck at time t. Throughout, we focus on Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE), where
strategies are only functions of the payo¤-relevant state variables.16 This allows us to drop
the dependence on industry j, thus we refer to R&D decisions by xn for the technology leader
that is n steps ahead and by x n for a follower that is n steps behind. Let us denote the
list of decisions by the leader and the follower with technology gap n at time t by n (t) 
hxn (t) ; pi (j; t) ; yi (j; t)i and  n (t)  hx n (t)i.17 Throughout,  will indicate the whole
sequence of decisions at every state, so that  (t)  fn (t)g1n= 1 : We dene an allocation as
follows:
Denition 1 (Allocation) Let  be the IPR policy sequence. Then an allocation is a sequence
of decisions for a leader that is n = 0; 1; 2; ::: step ahead, [n (t)]t0, a sequence of R&D
decisions for a follower that is n = 1; 2; ::: step behind,

 n (t)

t0, a sequence of wage rates
[w (t)]t0, and a sequence of industry distributions over technology gaps [ (t)]t0.
For given IPR sequence , MPE strategies, which are only functions of the payo¤-relevant
state variables, can be represented as follows
x : Z R2+  [0; 1]1! R+:
16MPE is a natural equilibrium concept in this context, since it does not allow for implicit collusive agreements
between the follower and the leader. While such collusive agreements may be likely when there are only two
rms in the industry, in most industries there are many more rms and also many potential entrants, making
collusion more di¢ cult. Throughout, we assume that there are only two rms to keep the model tractable.
17The price and output decisions, pi (j; t) and yi (j; t), depend not only on the technology gap, aggregate
output and the wage rate, but also on the exact technology rung of the leader, nij (t). With a slight abuse of
notation, throughout we suppress this dependence, since their product pi (j; t) yi (j; t) and the resulting prots
for the rm, (20), are independent of nij (t), and consequently, only the technology gap, nj (t), matters for
prots, R&D, aggregate output and economic growth.
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This mapping represents the R&D decision of a rm (both when it is the follower and when
it is the leader in an industry) as a function of the technology gap, n 2 Z, the aggregate level
of output and the wage, (Y;w) 2 R2+, and R&D decision of the other rm in the industry,
~x 2 [0; 1]1. Consequently, we have the following denition of equilibrium:
Denition 2 (Equilibrium) Given an IPR policy sequence , a Markov Perfect Equilibrium
is given by a sequence [ (t) ; w (t) ; Y  (t)]t0 such that (i) [p

i (j; t)]t0 and [y

i (j; t)]t0 im-
plied by [ (t)]t0 satisfy (12) and (13); (ii) R&D policy [x
 (t)]t0 is a best response to itself,
i.e., [x (t)]t0 maximizes the expected prots of rms taking aggregate output [Y
 (t)]t0, wages
[w (t)]t0, government policy  and the R&D policies of other rms [x
 (t)]t0 as given; (iii)
aggregate output [Y  (t)]t0 is given by (8); and (iv) the labor market clears at all times given
the wage sequence [w (t)]t0.
3.5 The Labor Market
Since only the technology leader produces, labor demand in industry j with technology gap
nj (t) = n can be expressed as
ln (t) =
 nY (t)
w (t)
for n 2 Z+: (21)
In addition, there is demand for labor coming for R&D from both followers and leaders in all
industries. Using (14) and the denition of the G function, we can express industry demands
for R&D labor as
hn (t) = G (xn (t)) +G (x n (t)) for n 2 Z+ ; (22)
where G (xn (t)) and G (x n (t)) refer to the demand of the leader and the follower in an
industry with a technology gap of n. Note that in this expression, x n (t) refers to the R&D
e¤ort of a follower that is n steps behind.
The labor market clearing condition can then be expressed as:
1 
1X
n=0
n (t)

1
! (t)n
+G (xn (t)) +G (x n (t))

; (23)
and ! (t)  0, with complementary slackness, where
! (t)  w (t)
Y (t)
(24)
is the labor share at time t. The labor market clearing condition, (23), uses the fact that total
supply is equal to 1, and demand cannot exceed this amount. If demand falls short of 1, then
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the wage rate, w (t), and thus the labor share, ! (t), have to be equal to zero (though this
will never be the case in equilibrium). The right-hand side of (23) consists of the demand for
production (the terms with ! in the denominator), the demand for R&D workers from the
neck-and-neck industries (2G (x0 (t)) when n = 0) and the demand for R&D workers coming
from leaders and followers in other industries (G (xn (t)) +G (x n (t)) when n > 0).
Dening the index of aggregate quality in this economy by the aggregate of the qualities
of the leaders in the di¤erent industries, i.e.,
lnQ (t) 
Z 1
0
ln qi (j; t) dj; (25)
the equilibrium wage can be written as:18
w (t) = Q (t) 
P1
n=0 nn(t): (26)
3.6 Steady State and the Value Functions under Quick Catch-up
Let us now focus on steady-state (Markov Perfect) equilibria, where the distribution of in-
dustries  (t)  fn (t)g1n=0 is stationary, ! (t) dened in (24) and g; the growth rate of the
economy, are constant over time. We will establish the existence of such an equilibrium and
characterize a number of its properties. If the economy is in steady state at time t = 0, then
by denition, we have Y  (t) = Y0eg
t and w (t) = w0eg
t, where g is the steady-state growth
rate. These two equations also imply that ! (t) = ! for all t  0. Throughout, we assume
that the parameters are such that the steady-state growth rate g is positive but not large
enough to violate the transversality conditions. This implies that net present values of each
rm at all points in time will be nite. This enables us to write the maximization problem of
a leader that is n > 0 steps ahead recursively.
First note that given an optimal policy x^ for a rm, the net present discounted value of a
leader that is n steps ahead at time t can be written as:
Vn (t) = Et
Z 1
t
exp ( r (s  t)) [ (s)  w (s)G (x^ (s))] ds
where  (s) is the operating prot at time s  t and w (s)G (x^ (s)) denotes the R&D expendi-
ture at time s  t. All variables are stochastic and depend on the evolution of the technology
gap within the industry.
18Note that lnY (t) =
R 1
0
ln qi (j; t) l (j; t) dj =
R 1
0
h
ln qi (j; t) + ln
Y (t)
w(t)
 nj
i
dj, where the second equality uses
(21). Thus we have lnY (t) =
R 1
0
[ln qi (j; t) + lnY (t)  lnw (t)  nj ln] dj. Rearranging and canceling terms,
and writing exp
R
nj lndj = 
 P1n=0 nn(t), we obtain (26).
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Next taking as given the equilibrium R&D policy of other rms, x n (t), the equilibrium
interest and wage rates, r (t) and w (t), and equilibrium prots fn (t)g1n=1 (as a function of
equilibrium aggregate output), this value can be written as (see the Appendix for the derivation
of this equation):19
r (t)Vn (t)  _Vn (t) = max
xn(t)0

[n (t)  w (t)G (xn (t))] + xn (t) [Vn+1 (t)  Vn (t)]
+
 
x n (t) + n

[V0 (t)  Vn (t)]

; (27)
where _Vn (t) denotes the derivative of Vn (t) with respect to time. The rst term is current
prots minus R&D costs, while the second term captures the fact that the rm will undertake
an innovation at the ow rate xn (t) and increase its technology lead by one step. The remaining
terms incorporate changes in value due to quick catch-up by the follower (ow rate x n (t)+n
in the second line).
In steady state, the net present value of a rm that is n steps ahead, Vn (t), will also grow
at a constant rate g for all n 2 Z+. Let us then dene the normalized values as
vn (t)  Vn (t)
Y (t)
(28)
for all n 2 Z, which will be independent of time in steady state, i.e., vn (t) = vn.
Using (28) and the fact that from (7), r (t) = g (t)+, the recursive form of the steady-state
value function (27) can be written as:
vn = max
xn0
 
1   n  !G (xn) + xn [vn+1   vn] + x n + n [v0   vn]	 for n 2 N; (29)
where x n is the equilibrium value of R&D by a follower that is n steps behind, and ! is the
steady-state labor share (while xn is now explicitly chosen to maximize vn).
Similarly the value for neck-and-neck rms is
v0 = max
x00
f !G (x0) + x0 [v1   v0] + x0 [v 1   v0]g ; (30)
while the values for followers are given by
v n = max
x n0
f !G (x n) + [x n + n] [v0   v n] + xn [v n 1   v n]g for n 2 N: (31)
For neck-and-neck rms and followers, there are no instantaneous prots, which is reected
in (30) and (31). In the former case this is because neck-and-neck rms sell at marginal cost,
and in the latter case, this is because followers have no sales. These normalized value functions
19Clearly, this value function could be written for any arbitrary sequence of R&D policies of other rms. We
set the R&D policies of other rms to their equilibrium values, x n (t), to reduce notation in the main body of
the paper.
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emphasize that, because of growth, the e¤ective discount rate is r (t)   g (t) =  rather than
r (t).
The maximization problems in (29)-(31) immediately imply that any steady-state equilib-
rium R&D policies, x, must satisfy:
xn = max

G0 1

[vn+1   vn]
!

; 0

(32)
x n = max

G0 1

[v0   v n]
!

; 0

(33)
x0 = max

G0 1

[v1   v0]
!

; 0

; (34)
where the normalized value functions, the vs, are evaluated at the equilibrium, and G0 1 () is
the inverse of the derivative of the G function. Since G is twice continuously di¤erentiable and
strictly concave, G0 1 is continuously di¤erentiable and strictly increasing. These equations
therefore imply that innovation rates, the xns, will increase whenever the incremental value of
moving to the next step is greater and when the cost of R&D, as measured by the normalized
wage rate, !, is less. Note also that since G0 (0) > 0, these R&D levels can be equal to zero,
which is taken care of by the max operator.
The response of innovation rates, xn, to the increments in values, vn+1   vn, is the key
economic force in this model. A policy that reduces the patent protection of leaders that are n+
1 steps ahead (by increasing n+1) will make being n+1 steps ahead less protable, thus reduce
vn+1   vn and xn. This corresponds to the standard disincentive e¤ect of relaxing IPR policy.
This result corresponds to fact (1) in the toy model. In contrast to existing models, however,
here relaxing IPR policy can also create a positive incentive e¤ect. Somewhat paradoxically,
lower protection for technology leaders that are n + 1 steps ahead will tend to reduce vn+1,
thus increasing vn+2   vn+1 and xn+1. This result is very similar to fact (2) in the toy model.
We will see this positive incentive e¤ect plays an important role in the form of optimal state-
dependent IPR policy. In addition to the incentive e¤ects, relaxing IPR protection may also
create a benecial composition e¤ect ; this is because, typically, fvn+1   vng1n=0 is a decreasing
sequence, which implies that xn 1 is higher than xn for n  1 (see, e.g., Proposition 4).
Weaker patent protection (in the form of shorter patent lengths) will shift more industries
into the neck-and-neck state and potentially increase the equilibrium level of R&D in the
economy. Finally, weaker patent protection also creates a benecial level e¤ectby inuencing
equilibrium markups and prices (as shown in equation (12) above) and by reallocating some
of the workers engaged in duplicativeR&D to production. This level e¤ect will also feature
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in our welfare computations. The optimal level and structure of IPR policy in this economy
will be determined by the interplay of these various forces.
Given the equilibrium R&D decisions x, the steady-state distribution of industries across
states  has to satisfy the following accounting identities:
 
xn+1 + x

 n 1 + n+1

n+1 = x

n

n for n 2 N; (35) 
x1 + x

 1 + 1

1 = 2x

0

0; (36)
2x0

0 =
1X
n=1
 
x n + n

n: (37)
The rst expression equates exit from state n+1 (which takes the form of the leader going one
more step ahead or the follower catching up the leader) to entry into the state (which takes
the form of a leader from state n making one more innovation). The second equation, (36),
performs the same accounting for state 1, taking into account that entry into this state comes
from innovation by either of the two rms that are competing neck-and-neck. Finally, equation
(37) equates exit from state 0 with entry into this state, which comes from innovation by a
follower in any industry with n  1.
The labor market clearing condition in steady state can then be written as
1 
1X
n=0
n

1
!n
+G (xn) +G
 
x n

and !  0, (38)
with complementary slackness.
The next proposition characterizes the steady-state growth rate. As with all the other
results in the paper, the proof of this proposition is provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 Let the steady-state distribution of industries and R&D decisions be given by
< ; x >, then the steady-state growth rate is
g = ln
"
20x

0 +
1X
n=1
nx

n
#
: (39)
This proposition claries that the steady-state growth rate of the economy is determined
by two factors: (1) R&D decisions of industries at di¤erent levels of technology gap, x 
fxng1n= 1; (2) The distribution of industries across di¤erent technology gaps,   fng1n=0.
IPR policy a¤ects these two margins in di¤erent directions as illustrated by the discussion
above.
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4 Existence and Characterization of Steady-State Equilibria
We now dene a steady-state equilibrium in a more convenient form, which will be used to
establish existence and derive some of the properties of the equilibrium.
Denition 3 (Steady-State Equilibrium) Given an IPR policy , a steady-state equilib-
rium is a tuple < ; v; x; !; g > such that the distribution of industries  satisfy (35),
(36) and (37), the values v fvng1n= 1 satisfy (29), (30) and (31), the R&D decision x is
given by (32), (33) and (34), the steady-state labor share ! satises (38) and the steady-state
growth rate g is given by (39).
We next provide a characterization of the steady-state equilibrium, starting rst with the
case in which there is uniform IPR policy.
4.1 Uniform IPR Policy
Let us rst focus on the case where IPR policy is uniform, i.e. n =  <1 for all n 2 N and
we denote this by uni. In this case, (31) implies that the problem is identical for all followers,
so that v n = v 1 for n 2 N. Consequently, (31) can be replaced with the following simpler
equation:
v 1 = max
x 10
f !G (x 1) + [x 1 + ] [v0   v 1]g ; (40)
implying optimal R&D decisions for all followers of the form
x 1 = max

G0 1

[v0   v 1]
!

; 0

: (41)
Let us denote the sequence of value functions under uniform IPR as fvng1n= 1. We next
establish the existence of a steady-state equilibrium under uniform IPR and characterize some
of its most important properties. Establishing the existence of a steady-state equilibrium
in this economy is made complicated by the fact that the equilibrium allocation cannot be
represented as a solution to a maximization problem. Instead, as emphasized by Denition
3, each rm maximizes its value taking the R&D decisions of other rms as given; thus an
equilibrium corresponds to a set of R&D decisions that are best responses to themselves and
a labor share (wage rate) ! that clears the labor market. Nevertheless, there is su¢ cient
structure in the model to guarantee the existence of a steady-state equilibrium and monotonic
behavior of values and R&D decisions.
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Proposition 4 Consider a uniform IPR policy uni and suppose that
G0 1
  
1   1 = (+ ) > 0. Then a steady-state equilibrium < ; v; x; !; g > exists.
Moreover, in any steady-state equilibrium ! < 1. In addition, if either  > 0 or x 1 > 0,
then g > 0. For any steady-state R&D decisions x, the steady-state distribution of industries
 is uniquely determined.
In addition, we have the following results:
 v 1  v0 and fvng1n=0 forms a bounded and strictly increasing sequence converging to
some v1 2 (0;1).
 x0 > x1, x0  x 1, and xn+1  xn for all n 2 N with xn+1 < xn if xn > 0. Moreover,
provided that G0 1
  
1   1 = (+ ) > 0 and x0 > x 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Remark 1 The condition that G0 1
  
1   1 = (+ ) > 0 ensures that there will be posi-
tive R&D in equilibrium. If this condition does not hold, then there exists a trivial steady-state
equilibrium in which xn = 0 for all n 2 Z+, i.e., an equilibrium in which there is no innovation
and thus no growth (this follows from the fact that x0  xn for all n 6= 0, see the Appendix
for more details). Moreover, if  > 0, then this equilibrium would also involve 0 = 1, so that
in every industry two rms with equal costs compete a la Bertrand and charge price equal to
marginal cost, leading to zero aggregate prots and a labor share of output equal to 1. The
assumption that G0 1
  
1   1 = (+ ) > 0, on the other hand, is su¢ cient to rule out
0 = 1 and thus ! = 1. If, in addition, the steady-state equilibrium involves some probability
of catch-up or innovation by the followers, i.e., either  > 0 or x 1 > 0, then the growth rate
is also strictly positive.
In addition to the existence of a steady-state equilibrium with positive growth, Proposition
4 shows that the sequence of values fvng1n=0 is strictly increasing and converges to some v1, and
more importantly that x  fxng1n=1 is a decreasing sequence, which implies that technology
leaders that are further ahead undertake less R&D. Intuitively, the benets of further R&D
are decreasing in the technology gap, since greater values of the technology gap translate into
smaller increases in the equilibrium markup (recall (20)). Moreover, the R&D level of neck
and-and-neck rms, x0, is greater than both the R&D level of technology leaders that are
one step ahead and followers that are one step behind (i.e., x0 > x1 and x0  x 1). This
implies that with uniform policy neck-and-neck industries are most R&D intensive, while
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industries with the largest technology gaps are least R&D intensive. This is the basis of
the conjecture mentioned in the Introduction that reducing protection given to technologically
advanced leaders might be useful for increasing R&D by bringing them into the neck-and-neck
state.
4.2 State-Dependent IPR Policy
We now extend the results from the previous section to the environment with state-dependent
IPR policy, though results on monotonicity of values and R&D e¤orts no longer hold.20
Proposition 5 Consider the state-dependent IPR policy  and suppose that
G0 1
  
1   1 = (+ 1) > 0. Then a steady-state equilibrium < ; v; x; !; g >
exists. Moreover, in any steady-state equilibrium ! < 1. In addition, if either 1 > 0 or
x 1 > 0, then g > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine the optimal (welfare- or growth-maximizing)
state-dependent IPR policy analytically. For this reason, in Section 5, we undertake a quan-
titative investigation of the form and structure of optimal state-dependent IPR policy using
plausible parameter values.
5 Optimal IPR Policy: Towards A Quantitative Investigation
In the remainder of the paper, we investigate the implications of various di¤erent types of
IPR policies on R&D, growth and welfare using numerical computations of the steady-state
equilibrium. Our purpose is not to provide a detailed calibration of the model economy but
to highlight its qualitative implications for optimal IPR policy under plausible parameter
values. We focus on optimal policy, dened as steady-state welfare-maximizing choice of pol-
icy (growth-maximizing policies give very similar results and are omitted to save space). In
this section, we introduce the measure of steady-state welfare and describe our quantitative
methodology. Results are reported in the subsequent sections.
20This is because IPR policies could be very sharply increasing at some technology gap, making a particular
state very unattractive for the leader. For example, we could have n = 0 and n+1 ! 1, which would imply
that vn+1   vn is negative.
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5.1 Welfare
Our focus so far has been on steady-state equilibria (mainly because of the very challenging
nature of transitional dynamics in this class of models). In our quantitative analysis, we
continue to focus on steady states and thus look at steady-state welfare. In a steady-state
equilibrium, welfare at time t = 0 can be written as
Welfare (0) =
Z 1
0
e t ln

Y (0) eg
t

dt
=
lnY (0)

+
g
2
; (42)
where the rst-line uses the facts that all output is consumed, utility is logarithmic (recall (6)),
output and consumption at date t = 0 are given by Y (0), and in the steady-state equilibrium
output grows at the rate g. The second line simply evaluates the integral. Next, note that
lnY (t) =
Z 1
0
ln y (j; t) dj
=
Z 1
0
ln

q i (j; t)Y (t)
w (t)

dj
=
Z 1
0
ln q i (j; t) dj   ln! (t)
= lnQ (t)  ln
 1X
n=0
nn (t)
!
  ln! (t) ; (43)
where the rst line simply uses the denition in (8), the second line substitutes for y (j; t)
from (13), the third line uses the denition of the labor share ! (t), and the nal line uses the
denition of Q (t) from (25) together with the fact that in the steady state qi (j; t) = nq i (j; t)
in a fraction n (t) of industries. The expression in (43) implies that output simply depends
on the quality index, Q (t), the distribution of technology gaps,  (t) (because this determines
markups), and also on the labor share, ! (t). In steady-state equilibrium, the distribution of
technology gaps and labor share are constant, while output and the quality index grow at
the steady-state rate g. Therefore, for steady-state comparisons of welfare across economies
with di¤erent policies, it is su¢ cient to compare two economies with the same level of Q (0),
but with di¤erent policies. We can then evaluate steady-state welfare with the distribution of
industries given by their steady-state values in the two economies, and output and the quality
index growing at the corresponding steady-state growth rates. Expression (43) also makes it
clear that only the aggregate quality index Q (0) needs to be taken to be the same in the
di¤erent economies. Given Q (0), the dispersion of industries in terms of the quality levels
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has no e¤ect on output or welfare (though, clearly, the distribution of industries in terms of
technology gaps between leaders and followers, , inuences the level of markups and output,
and thus welfare).
However, note one di¢ culty with welfare comparisons highlighted by equations (42) and
(43); proportional changes in steady-state welfare due to policy changes will depend on the
initial level of Q (0), which is an arbitrary number. Therefore, proportional changes in wel-
fare are not informative, though this has no e¤ect on ordinal rankings and thus welfare-
maximizing policy is well dened and independent of the level of Q (0). Equations (42) and
(43) also make it clear that changes in steady-state welfare will be the sum of two compo-
nents: the rst is the growth e¤ect, given by g=2, whereas the second is due to changes in
ln (
P1
n=0 nn) =  ln! (0). Since changes in the labor share ! (0) are largely driven by the
distribution of industries, we refer to this as the distribution e¤ect. Policies will typically a¤ect
both of these quantities. In what follows, we give the welfare rankings of di¤erent policies and
then report the relative magnitudes of the growth and the distribution e¤ects. This will show
that the growth e¤ects will be one or two orders of magnitude greater than the distribution
e¤ects and dominate welfare comparisons. So if the reader wishes, he or she may think of the
magnitudes of the changes in welfare as given by the proportional changes in growth rates.
5.2 Quantitative Methods and Parameter Choices
For our quantitative exercise, we take the annual discount rate as 5%, i.e., year = 0:05. In all
our computations, we work with the monthly equivalent of this discount rate in order to increase
precision, but throughout the tables, we convert all numbers to their annual counterparts to
facilitate interpretation.
The theoretical analysis considered a general production function for R&D given by (14).
The empirical literature typically assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function. For example,
Kortum (1993) considers a function of the form
Innovation (t) = B0 exp (t) (R&D inputs)
 ; (44)
where B0 is a constant and exp (t) is a trend term, which may depend on general technological
trends, a drift in technological opportunities, or changes in general equilibrium prices (such as
wages of researchers etc.). The advantage of this form is not only its simplicity, but also the
fact that most empirical work estimates a single elasticity for the response of innovation rates
to R&D inputs. Consequently, they essentially only give information about the parameter 
in terms of equation (44). A low value of  implies that the R&D production function is more
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concave. For example, Kortum (1993) reports that estimates of  vary between 0.1 and 0.6
(see also Pakes and Griliches, 1980, or Hall, Hausman and Griliches, 1988). For these reasons,
throughout, we adopt a R&D production function similar to (44):
x = Bh (45)
whereB;  > 0. In terms of our previous notation, equation (45) implies thatG (x) = [x=B]
1
 w,
where w is the wage rate in the economy (thus in terms of the above function, it is captured by
the exp (t) term).21 Equation (45) does not satisfy the boundary conditions we imposed so far
and can be easily modied to do so without a¤ecting any of the results, since in all numerical
exercises only a nite number of states are reached.22 Following the estimates reported in
Kortum (1993), we start with a benchmark value of  = 0:35, and then report sensitivity
checks for  = 0:1 and  = 0:6. The other parameter in (45), B, is chosen so as to ensure an
annual growth rate of approximately 1.9%, i.e., g ' 0:019, in the benchmark economy which
features indenitely-enforced patents. This growth rate together with year = 0:05 also pins
down the annual interest rate as ryear = 0:069 from equation (7).
We choose the value of  using a reasoning similar to Stokey (1995). Equation (39) implies
that if the expected duration of time between any two consecutive innovations is about 3 years
in an industry, then a growth rate of about 1.9% would require  = 1:05.23 This value is also
consistent with the empirical ndings of Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen (2005).24 We
take  = 1:05 as the benchmark value. We then check the robustness of the results to  = 1:01
and  = 1:2 (expected duration of 8 months and 13 years, respectively). Finally, without loss
21More specically, (45) can be alternatively written as
Innovation (t) = Bw (t)  (R&D expenditure) ;
thus would be equivalent to (44) as long as the growth of w (t) can be approximated by constant rate.
22For example, we could add a small linear term to the production function for R&D, (45), and also make it
at after some level h. For example, the following generalization of (45),
x = min

Bh + "h;Bh + "h
	
for " small and h large, makes no di¤erence to our simulation results.
23 In particular, in our benchmark parameterization with full protection without licensing, 24% of industries
are in the neck-and-neck state. This implies that improvements in the technological capability of the economy
is driven by the R&D e¤orts of the leaders in 76% of the industries and the R&D e¤orts of both the leaders and
the followers in 24% of the industries. Therefore, the growth equation, (39), implies that g ' ln  1:24  x,
where x denotes the average frequency of innovation in a given industry. A major innovation on average every
three years implies a value of  ' 1:05.
24The production function for the intermediate good, (10), can be written as log (y (j; t)) = n (j; t) log () +
log (l (j; t)), where n (j; t) is the number of innovations to date in sector j and represents the knowledge stock
of this industry. Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen (2005) proxy the knowledge stock in an industry by
the stock of R&D in that industry and estimate the elasticity of sales with respect to the stock of R&D to be
approximately 0.06. In terms of the exercise here, this implies that log () = 0:06, or that   1:06.
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of generality, we normalize labor supply to 1. This completes the determination of all the
parameters in the model except the IPR policy.
As noted above, we begin with the full patent protection regime, i.e.,  = f0; 0; :::g. We
then move to a comparison of the optimal (welfare-maximizing) uniform IPR policy uni to
the optimal state-dependent IPR policy. Since it is computationally impossible to calculate
the optimal value of each n, we limit our investigation to a particular form of state-dependent
IPR policy, whereby the same  applies to all industries that have a technology gap of n = 5
or more. In other words, the IPR policy can be represented as:
IPR policy!
Technology gap: n!
none 
0
1z}|{ 
1
2z}|{ 
2
3z}|{ 
3
4z}|{ 
4
5z }| { 
5
 
6
 
7
 
8
 
9
 
10
 
11
 
:
 
:
 
1
We checked and veried that allowing for further exibility (e.g., allowing 5 and 6 to di¤er)
has little e¤ect on our results.
The numerical methodology we pursue relies on uniformization and value function iteration.
The details of the uniformization technique are described in the proof of Lemma 1 in the
Appendix (for details of value function iteration, see Judd, 1999). In particular, we rst take
the IPR policy  as given and make an initial guess for the equilibrium labor share !. Then
for a given !, we generate a sequence of values fvng1n= 1, and we derive the optimal R&D
policies, fxng1n= 1 and the steady-state distribution of industries, fng1n=0. After convergence,
we compute the growth rate g and welfare, and then check for market clearing in the labor
market from equation (23). Depending on whether there is excess demand for or supply
of labor, ! is varied and the numerical procedure is repeated until the entire steady-state
equilibrium for a given IPR policy is computed. The process is then repeated for di¤erent IPR
policies.
In the state-dependent IPR case, the optimal (welfare-maximizing) IPR policy sequences,
; are computed one element at a time, until we nd the welfare-maximizing value for that
component, for example, 1. We then move the next component, for example, 2. Once the
welfare-maximizing value of 2 is determined, we go back to optimize over 1 again, and this
procedure is repeated recursively until convergence.25
6 Optimal IPR Policy
In this section, we present a quantitative analysis of our baseline model.
25After we nd a maximizer (), we also evaluate several random policy combinations around the maximizer
to verify the solution.
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6.1 Full IPR Protection
We start with the benchmark with full protection, which is the case that the existing literature
has considered so far (e.g., Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers, 2001). In terms of our model,
this corresponds to n = 0 for all n. We choose the parameter B in terms of (45), so that the
benchmark economy has an annual growth rate of 1.86%.
[Figure 3 & 4 & 5 here]
The value function for this benchmark case is shown in Figure 3 (solid line). The value
function has decreasing di¤erences for n  0, which is consistent with the results in Proposition
4, and features a constant level for all followers (since there is no state dependence in the IPR
policy). Figure 4 shows the level of R&D e¤orts for leaders and followers in this benchmark
(again solid line). Again consistent with Proposition 4, this gure also shows that the R&D
level of a leader declines as the technology gap increases and that the highest level of R&D
is for rms that are neck-and-neck (i.e., at the technology gap of n = 0). Since there is no
state-dependent IPR policy, all followers undertake the same level of R&D e¤ort, which is also
shown in the gure.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of industries according to technology gaps (again the solid
line refers to the benchmark case). The mode of the distribution is at the technology gap of
n = 1, but there is also a signicant concentration of industries at technology gap n = 0,
because innovations by the followers take them to the neck-and-neckstate.
[Table 1 here]
The rst column of Table 1 also reports the results for this benchmark simulation. As noted
above, in each case B is chosen such that the annual growth rate is equal to 0.0186, which
is recorded at the bottom of Table 1 together with the initial consumption and welfare levels
according to (42) and (43). The table also shows the R&D levels x0, x 1 and x1 (0.35, 0.22 and
0.29), the frequencies of industries with technology gaps of 0, 1 and 2. The steady-state value of
! is 0.95. Since labor is the only factor of production in the economy, ! should not be thought
of as the labor share in GDP. Instead, 1  ! measures the share of pure monopoly prots in
value added. In the benchmark parameterization, this corresponds to 5% of GDP, which is
reasonable.26 Finally, the table also shows that in this benchmark parameterization 3.2% of
26Bureau of Economic Analysis (2004) reports that the ratio of before-tax prots to GDP in the US economy
in 2001 was 7% and the after-tax ratio was 5%.
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the workforce is working as researchers, which is also consistent with US data.27 These results
are encouraging for our simple quantitative exercise, since with very few parameter choices,
the model generates reasonable numbers, especially for the share of the workforce allocated to
research.28
6.2 Optimal Uniform IPR Protection
For reference, we now characterize optimal uniform IPR policy, that is, we impose that n = 
for all n, and look for values of  that maximizes the welfare in the economy. Column 2 of
Table 1 shows that the welfare-maximizing value of  is not di¤erent from zero at the three-digit
level. Therefore the results of the full protection case carries over to uniform policy as well.
The main reason for this result is the quick catch-up assumption. Recall that the uniform IPR
policy discourages innovation, but generates a potential benet because of the composition
e¤ect (bringing more rms into neck-and-neck position). In the quick catch-up regime, rms
come into neck-and-neck position at a Poisson rate of 0.22, which results in 35% of sectors
being in state 0 and 77% at two-step gap or below. This implies that there are only limited
composition gains. In this light, it is not surprising that relaxing the IPR protection uniformly
is not benecial; it generates a signicant disincentive e¤ect and little benet. Therefore,
optimal IPR policy is to set full protection,  = 0, and thus the value functions, innovation
rates and industry distributions under optimal uniform IPR policy are given by the solid lines
in Figures 3-5.
6.3 Optimal State-Dependent IPR
We next turn to our major question; whether state-dependent IPR makes a signicant di¤er-
ence relative to the uniform IPR. In particular, we look for the combination of f1; :::; 5g that
maximizes the welfare. The new value function, innovation rates and industry distribution are
plotted in Figure 3-5 and the numerical results are shown in column 3 of Table 1.
Two features are worth noting. First, the growth rate increases noticeably relative to
column 1; it is now 2.04% instead of 1.86%. Second and more important, we see the key pattern
that will be present in all of our quantitative results: optimal state-dependent policy f1; :::; 5g
27According to National Science Foundation (2006), the ratio of scientists and engineers in the US workforce
in 2001 is about 4%.
28Most endogenous growth models imply that a signicantly greater fraction of the labor force should be
employed in the research sector and one needs to introduce various additional factors to reduce the protability
of research or to make entry into research more di¢ cult. In the current model, the step-by-step nature of
innovation and competition plays this role and generates a plausible allocation of workers between research and
production.
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provides greater protection to technology leaders that are further ahead. In particular, we nd
that the optimal policy involves 1 = 0:71, 2 = 0:08, and 3 = 4 = 5 = 0. This corresponds
to very little patent protection for rms that are one step ahead of the followers. In particular,
since 1 = 0:71 and x
 1 = 0:12, in this equilibrium rms that are one step behind followers are
more than six times as likely to catch up with the technology leader because of the expiration
of the patent of the leader as they are likely to catch up because of their own successful R&D.
Then, there is a steep increase in the protection provided to technology leaders that are two
steps ahead, and 2 is 1/12th of 1. Perhaps even more remarkably, after a technology gap of
three or more steps, optimal IPR involves full protection, and patents never expire.
This pattern of greater protection for technology leaders that are further ahead may go
against a naïve intuition that state-dependent IPR policy should try to boost the growth rate
of the economy by bringing the industries with largest technology gaps (where leaders engage in
little R&D) into neck-and-neck competition. This composition e¤ect is present, but dominated
by another, more powerful force, the trickle-down e¤ect. The intuition for the trickle-down
e¤ect is as follows: by providing secure patent protection to rms that are three or more steps
ahead of their rivals, optimal state-dependent IPR increases the R&D e¤ort of leaders that are
one and two steps ahead as well. This is because technology leaders that are only one or two
steps ahead now face greater returns to R&D, which will not only increase their prots but
also the security of their intellectual property. Mechanically, high levels of 1 and 2 reduce
v1 and v2, while high IPR protection for more advanced rms increases vn for n  3, and this
increases the R&D incentives of leaders at n = 1 or at n = 2.29
Providing more secure patent protection through less frequent catch-up benets an n-step
leader more than (n+ 1)-step leader since the preserved prot is higher for a more advanced
rm. This results in a steeper value function as illustrated in Figure 3. The slope of the value
function is the key determining factor for R&D decisions and this increase in slope reects
itself in overall higher R&D e¤ort by the leaders in Figure 4. It is also notable that state-
dependent IPR introduces positive incentive e¤ect while gaining also from the composition.
Figure 5 shows that the mode of the new distribution is at n = 0: The average innovation rate
is higher (as reected on a higher growth rate, g = 2:04%) and the average mark-up is lower
(C (0) increases by 52%). This pattern of greater R&D investments under state-dependent
29An alternative intuition, suggested by an anonymous referee, is that when the technology gap is greater,
leaders will lose more from a relaxation of IPR. However, this intuition can only be partial, since, as shown in
Section 2, state-dependent relaxation of IPR in this form creates a positive incentive e¤ect, which is central to
our results (and this is independent of how much technology leaders lose as a result of the relaxation of IPR).
As a result, we believe that the trickle-down of incentives is the more correct intuition for our results.
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IPR contrasts with uniform IPR, which always reduces R&D of all rms. The possibility that
imperfect state-dependent IPR protection can increase (rather than reduce) R&D incentives
is a novel feature of our approach and has also been shown explicitly in the partial equilibrium
model of Section 2.
6.4 Robustness
The patterns shown in Figures 3-5 and Table 1 are highly robust. In the working paper version,
we repeated this entire exercise for various combinations of values of  and  (in particular,
varying  to  = 0:1 and  = 0:6, and  to  = 1:01 and  = 1:2). The overall pattern and
in fact the quantitative magnitudes are remarkably similar to the baseline reported here. We
do not report these robustness checks to save space (they are available upon request); instead,
we focus on the results in the slow catch-up regime.
7 Optimal IPR Policy in the Slow Catch-up Regime
In this section, we extend our analysis to an environment where followers close the gap with
technology leaders also step by step. This environment will further allow us to introduce
di¤erent types of R&D e¤orts by followers and study several di¤erent dimensions of IPR
policy.
7.1 Value Functions
The environment is the same as in Section 3, except that we now assume that successful R&D
by followers close is the gap between themselves and the technology leader by one step. We
will allow for di¤erent types of R&D below. The equivalent expressions for the value functions
(29)-(31) in this case are
vn = max
xn0
 
1   n  !G (xn) + xn [vn+1   vn] + x n [vn 1   vn] + n [v0   vn]	 for n 2 N;
(46)
v0 = max
x00
f !G (x0) + x0 [v1   v0] + x0 [v 1   v0]g ; (47)
and
v n = max
x n0
f !G (x n) + x n [v n+1   v n] + xn [v n 1   v n] + n [v0   v n]g for n 2 N:
(48)
These expressions are intuitive in light of those presented in Section 3, in particular, (29)-
(31). The only di¤erence from equations (29)-(31) is that, when a follower innovates, an
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n-step leaders value changes from vn to vn 1 instead of dropping all the way to v0, since this
innovation closes the technology gap only by one step. Similarly, in this event, the followers
value changes from v n to v n+1 instead of increasing all the way to v0. The rest of the analysis
mirrors that in Section 4. In particular, existence of stationary equilibria can be proved using
an analogous argument to that provided in the Appendix, but we are not able to prove the
analogue of the second part of Proposition 4.
7.2 Quantitative Results
We next investigate the form of optimal IPR policy in the baseline slow catch-up regime.
7.2.1 Full IPR Protection
Under the slow catch-up regime, setting n = 0, that is, providing full protection via innite
patent length generates too little catch-up by the followers. Consequently, the steady-state
distribution has little mass at or around the neck-and-neck state (n = 0). To generate a
more plausible distribution with a non-zero share of industries in the neck-and-neck state, we
instead impose n = 0:02, which implies an expected length of patent protection of 50 years
(as the full protection benchmark) under slow catch-up regime.
[Table 2 here]
The rst column of Table 2 reports the results under this scenario. Even with 50 years of
protection, the share of industries that are neck-and-neck is only 2%, and the total share of
industries that have a gap of less than two steps is only 8%. One implication of this pattern is
that a relaxation of IPR policy may now be more powerful because it can a¤ect the composition
of industries, reduce the average mark-up in the economy, and perhaps have a large e¤ect on
average R&D. Therefore, this is a particularly relevant environment for investigating whether
the trickle-down of incentives identied in the previous section is present and robust in di¤erent
and perhaps more realistic environments.
7.2.2 Optimal Uniform IPR Protection
The second column of Table 2 shows optimal uniform IPR policy in this case. Consistent
with Proposition 1 in Section 2, relaxing IPR protection creates a powerful disincentive e¤ect.
However, it also generates a benecial composition e¤ect by bringing more and more rms
into neck-and-neck competition. For this reason, optimal uniform IPR policy is no longer full
protection.
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The results in the table show that the optimal policy reduces patent length from  = 0:02
(average protection of 50 years) to  = 0:11 (average protection of 9 years). This involves
a lower innovation rate for technology leaders that are one-step ahead (from 1:1 to 0:15).
Similarly average R&D is also reduced and the aggregate growth rate declines from 2:5% to
2:3%: However, because of the increase in the share of neck-and-neck industries (from 2% to
16%) and the increase in the total share of industries that are in the rst 3 states (from 8% to
49%), the average mark-up in the economy decreases. This enables a large (19-fold) increase
in initial consumption C (0) (which is the reason why this policy is optimal even though it
reduces growth).
7.2.3 Optimal State-Dependent IPR
Once again, the most interesting case is when IPR policy is state dependent. In this case,
the optimal policy not only benets from the composition e¤ect, but can do so without sacri-
cing growth (by exploiting the positive incentive and the trickle-down e¤ects highlighted in
Proposition 2 in Section 2).
The optimal state-dependent policies shown in column 3 of Table 2. Under this optimal
policy, the share of the rst three states increases by an additional 6 percentage point (55%)
and the initial consumption further increases relative to the uniform IPR policy by 30%. More
interestingly, the innovation rate of a one-step leader now increases from 0:15 to 0:51 (relative
to the uniform policy case) and the growth rate increases back to 2:5%. It is noteworthy that
these gains are achieved by providing stronger protections to more advanced rms, and thus
exploiting the trickle-down e¤ect. For example, under the optimal policy one-step leader is
caught up seven times more frequently than a ve-step leader due to patent expiration.
7.3 Compulsory Licensing
In this subsection, we introduce (compulsory) licensing. Several recent empirical papers suggest
that licensing has a signicant positive impact on rm innovation (e.g., Moser and Voena, 2011,
Almeida and Fernandes, 2008). Consistent with these ndings, we model licensing as a way of
generating knowledge spillovers to the licensee rm. In particular, in addition to independent
R&D to proceed one step in the quality ladder, followers can also close all intervening steps by
reverse-engineering the current leading-edge technology. But this is only possible by making
use of the knowledge generated by the leading-edge technology, and the follower will have to
pay a prespecied license fee ^n (t)  0 to the leader. The licensing decision of the follower
 i is denoted by a i (j; t) = 1 (a i (j; t) = 0 corresponds to independent R&D). Throughout,
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we allow a i (j; t) 2 [0; 1] for mathematical convenience. The fees in question are compulsory
license fees imposed by policy and are state-dependent, and thus we represent them as:
^ (t) : N! R+ [ f+1g :
Note that ^ (t)
n
^1 (t) ; ^2 (t) ; :::
o
is a function of time. This is natural, since in a growing
economy, license fees should not remain constant. As in (28), in what follows we assume that
license fees are also scaled up by GDP, so that n  ^n (t) =Y (t), to keep the equilibrium
stationary. We discuss voluntary licensing below.
7.3.1 Value Functions with Compulsory Licensing
With a similar reasoning to before, relevant value functions in this case can be written as
vn = max
xn0
  
1   n  !G (xn) + xn [vn+1   vn]
+a nx n [v0   vn + n] +
 
1  a n

x n [vn 1   vn] + n [v0   vn]

for n 2 N;
where a n is the equilibrium value of licensing decision by a follower that is n steps behind, and
n is the license fee that it has to pay. The value for neck-and-neck rms remain unchanged
while the values for followers becomes
v n = max
x n0;a n2[0;1]
  !G (x n) + a nx n [v0   v n   n]
+ (1  a n)x n [v n+1   v n] + xn [v n 1   v n] + n [v0   v n]

for n 2 N;
Note that licensing a n 2 [0; 1] is the new additional decision variable of the follower.
Full IPR protection in this case corresponds to prohibitively high licensing fees, i.e., n =1
for all n, and as in the previous subsection, patent protection has expected duration of 50
years ( = 0:02). Therefore, the results in this case will be identical to those reported for full
protection in the previous subsection (column 1 of Table 2). This is indeed the case; these
results are repeated in column 1 of Table 3 for ease of comparison with the remaining results
in this table.
[Table 3 here]
7.3.2 Optimal Uniform IPR Protection
Uniform compulsory licensing policy now corresponds to n = 
  0: The results under the
optimal choice of such uniform compulsory licensing policy are reported in the second column
of Table 3. This optimal policy involves  = 1:61, which is more than half of the surplus that
a three-step follower generates from licensing, v0   v 3 = 2:9.
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Since this type of licensing allows for more frequent catch-up by followers, a greater share
of industries are now in tight competition. In particular, the total share of industries with
one or two step gaps goes up to 66% (this number was 8% under full protection). This
again corresponds to a powerful composition e¤ect and generates a signicant reduction in the
average mark-up and a corresponding increase in initial consumption. However, consistent with
our previous results, this type of uniform licensing again generates a signicant disincentive
e¤ect on technology leaders. In particular, more frequent catch-up implies a shorter durations
of positive prots. As a result, innovation incentives are reduced; the innovation rate of a
one-step leader is now 0:43 instead of 1:1 and the average growth rate declines from 2:5% to
2:1%.
7.3.3 Optimal State-Dependent IPR
As in our previous exercises, the negative incentive e¤ects of uniform relaxations of IPR pro-
tection are rectied when policy is state dependent. Optimal state-dependent policy has in
fact qualitatively very similar pattern to those reported above. Most importantly, column 3 of
Table 3 shows that optimal state-dependent policy provides greater protection to technology
leaders that are more advanced. For example, while a two-step leader receives a license fee of
2 = 1:5, a ve-step leader receives more than its double, 

5 = 3:3: Given this pattern, the
trickle-down e¤ect is again at work and generates positive innovation incentives: the innova-
tion rate of a one-step leader increases to x1 = 0:46 and the aggregate growth rate goes back
to 2:5% from 2:1%: This positive gain is generated without sacricing the composition e¤ect.
Under this policy, 50% of total industries operate with a technology gap less than two and the
initial consumption C (0) is now even higher than under uniform policy (by 40%).
7.3.4 Compulsory Versus Bargained License Fees
The analysis so far has characterized the steady-state equilibrium for a given sequence of li-
cense fees , implicitly assumed to be determined by IPR policy i.e., these fees correspond
to compulsory licensing fees for intellectual property that has been patented. This, therefore,
corresponds to a world in which once a company patents an innovation, the knowledge embed-
ded in this innovation can be used by its competitors as long as they pay a prespecied license
fee.
One may also wish to consider an alternative world in which license fees are determined by
bilateral bargaining. To characterize the equilibrium in such a world, one must rst conduct
exactly the same analysis as we have done in this subsection. In other words, one must
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characterize the equilibrium for a given sequence of license fees, and then taking the license
fees agreed by other rms as given, one can consider the bargaining problem between a leader
and a follower. In general, there may or may not exist feasible voluntary license fees that the
follower and the leader can bargain to (such voluntary agreements may be infeasible even if
compulsory licensing is benecial, since consumers also benet from licensing).
[Figure 6 here]
Figure 6 plots the value of licensing to a follower in an industry with an n-step gap,
v0   v n+1, and absolute value of the loss to the leader in the same industry, jvn 1   v0j
(with full protection as in column 1 of Tables 2-5).30 The overall pattern is that the latter
number is unambiguously greater than the former, which implies that voluntary licensing will
not be benecial in this environment. Therefore, compulsory licensing plays a useful role that
bilateral licensing agreements between leaders and followers could not achieve, and is thus a
useful policy tool. In addition, our analysis shows that compulsory licensing will be useful for
welfare precisely when it is state dependent.
7.4 Leapfrogging and Infringement under Slow Catch-up
Finally, we allow the follower to engage in frontier R&D and leapfrogthe technology leader.
This exercise is useful for two reasons. First, the models analyzed so far do not allow R&D
by followers to directly contribute to aggregate growth. One might conjecture that this fea-
ture strengthens the trickle-down e¤ect. Second, frontier R&D and leapfrogging by followers
will allow us to introduce another relevant and important dimension of IPR policy, patent
infringement fees.
Suppose, now, that followers can undertake two types of R&D. The rst, which is what
we have focused on so far, is catch-up R&D, corresponding to R&D directed at discovering an
alternative way of performing the same task as the current leading-edge technology. Catch-up
R&D improves the technology of the follower by one step as before. The alternative, frontier
R&D, involves followers improving the current leading-edge technology. If this type of R&D
succeeds, the follower will have improved the leading-edge technology. However, following such
an event, the follower will be judged (e.g., by courts) to have infringed the patent of technology
30Without licensing, the change in followers value is v n+1   v n: Since licensing takes the follower to v0;
the change due to licensing is v0   v n+1: Similar reasoning applies to the leaders loss.
Note also that Figure 1 has no value for n = 0; 1 since neck-and-neck rms and one-step followers have no
surplus to generate through licensing.
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leader with probability  2 (0; 1) and will be required to pay a prespecied infringement penalty
(fee) #^n  0 to the leader. The infringement fees are also state dependent and represented by:
#^ (t) : N! R+ [ f+1g ;
and we again adopt the normalization #n  #^n (t) =Y (t), and denote the Poisson arrival rate
of innovation by catch-up R&D and frontier R&D by xcn and x
f
n; respectively. Then the new
value of an n-step leader takes the following form:
vn = max
xn0
  
1   n  !G (xn) + xn [vn+1   vn]
+xc n [vn 1   vn] + xf n [v 1   vn + #n] + n [v0   vn]

for n 2 N;
The main di¤erence in this equation is that the follower has two di¤erent arrival rates of
innovation. If the follower is successful with frontier R&D, the current leader falls one step
behind the follower. However, in this event, with probability  , it receives an infringement fee
of #n. With a similar reasoning, the value of an n-step follower now becomes:
v n = max
xc n0;xf n0
  !G (x n) + xc n [v n+1   v n] + xf n [v1   v n   #n]
+xn [v n 1   v n] + n [v0   v n]

for n 2 N:
The value of a neck-and-neck rm is unchanged.
The quantitative analysis requires an empirical estimate for  : Lanjouw and Schankerman
(2001) report that around 10% of the US utility patents are led for infringement. We therefore
set  = 0:1.
Note also that since the followers now improve the technology frontier through frontier
R&D, the aggregate growth rate becomes
g = ln
"
20x

0 +
1X
n=1
n

xn + x
f
 n
#
: (49)
Full protection in this case corresponds to innite patent infringement fees, i.e., #n = 1,
and given the same parameter choices as before, will be identical to column 1 of Table 2. We
repeat these results in column 1 of Table 4 for ease of comparison with the rest of the table.
[Table 4 here]
7.4.1 Optimal Uniform IPR Protection
In the uniform policy case, we set #n = #  0: Column 2 of Table 4 shows that the optimal
uniform policy in this case is # = 14: Recall that when a follower undertakes frontier inno-
vation, the probability the that it will have to make this payment is  = 0:1: Therefore the
36
expected infringement payment is   # = 1:4 which is more than half of the surplus that a
three-step follower generates out of leapfrogging, v1   v 3 = 2:7:
Column 2 also shows that under this policy, followers undertake more frontier R&D (xf 1 =
0:23) than catch-up R&D
 
xc 1 = 0:15

. Parallel to the previous uniform policies, the shorter
duration of monopoly position resulting from innovation reduces innovation incentives. For
example, one-step leaders now innovate at the rate 0.3 instead of 1.1. However, despite this
disincentive e¤ect, the growth rate increases slightly because leapfrogging allows followers to
directly contribute to aggregate growth, as shown by equation (49).
Column 2 also shows that the share of industries in one-step gap is now much larger,
1 = 0:42. This is because leapfrogging puts the follower one-step ahead of the previous
leader. Thanks to this e¤ect, optimal uniform IPR protection achieves lower average mark-up
and higher initial consumption as well as higher growth.
7.4.2 Optimal State-Dependent IPR
State-dependent IPR policy once again exploits the trickle-down e¤ect and creates positive
incentive e¤ects on innovation. The form of state-dependent policy is the same as before:
technologically more advanced leaders receive more protection in the form of higher fees when
followers infringe their patents. While a two-step leader receives #1 = 18:1 in case of in-
fringement, a ve-step leader receives more than double of this fee, #5 = 43:7: In expectation,
a three-step follower pays almost 3/4th of the surplus that it generates from leapfrogging
(  #3 = 3:1 versus v1   v 3 = 4:1). As a result of this pattern, state-dependent policy not
only generates a greater welfare gain in terms of the initial consumption (C (0) is now approx-
imately twice the level under the optimal uniform policy), but it also exploits the trickle-down
e¤ect and increases the equilibrium growth rate by an additional 0.5 percentage point relative
to the uniform policy.
7.5 Patent Length, Compulsory Licensing and Infringements Fees under
Slow Catch-up
In this subsection, we investigate the slow catch-up environment when all three IPR policies
are simultaneously present. We do not repeat the value functions to save space.
[Table 5 here]
Table 5 rst shows our benchmark full protection economy in the rst column. The second
and third columns report the optimal uniform and state-dependent policies with all three types
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of policies present. The results are very similar to those reported in subsection 7.4 (with only
leapfrogging), except that the patent lengths are now set to innity (n = 0). The optimal
IPR policy in this case involves innitely long patents with prohibitively high compulsory
license fees. The only dimension in which IPR protection is not full is because of moderate
infringement fees, which permit followers to undertake frontier R&D and leapfrog technology
leaders.
Most importantly for our focus, column 3 again shows the benets of state-dependent IPR
policy. This policy again provides greater protection for technology leaders and exploits the
trickle-down e¤ect. As a result, initial consumption is approximately twice the level under
uniform IPR and innovation incentives are stronger, and the long-run growth rate increases
from 2.5% to 3.3%.
7.6 Robustness Checks
Table 6 shows that the patterns documented in Table 5, particularly the gains from state-
dependent policy and the major role played by the trickle-down e¤ect, are robust for reasonable
changes in parameter values.
[Table 6 here]
In this table, in each column we change one of the two parameters  and  (increasing or
reducing  to 1.2 or 1.01, and increasing or reducing  to 0.6 or 0.1). In each case, we also
change the parameter B in equation (45) to ensure the growth rate of the benchmark economy
with full IPR protection is the same as in our initial baseline economy, g = 1:86%.
To save space, we only show the results from the optimal state-dependent policies. Table 6
shows that the qualitative patterns in Table 5 are relatively robust. In all cases, optimal state-
dependent IPR is shaped by the trickle-down e¤ect. In all of the various parameterizations we
have considered (and with di¤erent combinations of policies), there is little protection provided
to technology leaders that are one-step ahead, but IPR protection grows as the technology gap
increases. This is the typical pattern implied by the trickle-down e¤ect. In addition, in all
cases when all three forms of policy are incorporated, optimal IPR policy provides patents
of innite duration and prohibitively high compulsory licensing fees, but deviates from full
IPR protection by imposing moderate levels of infringement fees. Most importantly for us,
in all cases, these infringements fees are state dependent and provide greater protection to
technologically more advanced leaders.
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8 Conclusions
In this paper, we emphasized the importance of dynamic interactions between IPR protec-
tion and competition for understanding the structure of optimal IPR policy. Our main result
highlights the importance of a new and powerful e¤ect, the trickle-down e¤ect, which implies
that protection given to companies with signicant technological leads over their rivals also
dynamically incentivizes companies with more limited technological leads as further innova-
tion will not only increase their productivity but also grant them additional IPR protection.
This new e¤ect implies that optimal IPR policy should be state-dependent and provide greater
protection to companies with signicant technological leads and only limited IPR protection
for those without.
To systematically investigate these issues, we developed a dynamic general equilibrium
framework with cumulative (step-by-step) innovations. In each industry, technology leaders
innovate in order to widen the gap between themselves and the followers, which enables them
to charge higher markups. Followers innovate to catch up with or surpass the technology
leaders in their industry (by undertaking frontier R&D), and can also license the technology
of leaders. IPR policy regulates the length of patents, whether licensing is possible and the
size of patent infringement fees.
We provided existence and characterization results, and a quantitative analysis of the form
of optimal (welfare-maximizing) IPR policy. In several di¤erent environments and under
di¤erent parameter values, we consistently found that the trickle-down e¤ect is present and
powerful. It implies that optimal IPR should be state-dependent and should provide greater
protection to rms with greater technological lead over their rivals. In our benchmark para-
meterization, for example, optimal IPR policy increases the growth rate of the economy from
1.86% to 2.04%, and does so while also signicantly increasing initial consumption (and in
fact reducing the overall amount of resources allocated to the R&D sector). We also showed
that similar qualitative and quantitative results are obtained when followers catch up with
technology leaders only slowly. In this extended environment, we also investigated the form of
optimal compulsory licensing fees and patent infringement fees, and found them to be similarly
state-dependent (in a way that provides greater protection to rms that are technologically
more advanced relative to their rivals). These extensions further showed that compulsory li-
censing, which allows followers to build on the leading-edge technology in return of a license
fee, also has a major impact on the equilibrium growth rate.
Our main results go against a naïve intuition that providing less protection to techno-
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logically more advanced rms is socially benecial because it would exploit a composition
e¤ect (bringing rms that are furthest apart into neck and neckcompetition to both reduce
markups and increase R&D which results from tight competition). This naïve intuition is not
correct precisely because of the trickle-down e¤ect we emphasized above. The trickle-down
e¤ect implies that providing greater protection to su¢ ciently advanced technology leaders not
only increases their R&D e¤orts but also raises the R&D e¤orts of all technology leaders that
are less advanced than this level. This is because the reward to innovation now includes the
greater protection that they will receive once they reach this higher level of technology. Our
analysis and results suggest that in addition to the reasoning based on the static trade-o¤
between IPR protection and competition, the trickle-down e¤ect should also be factored into
policy analysis, and naturally calls for future empirical work to estimate its empirical magni-
tude.
In this context, it should be emphasized that our objective in this paper has not been to
derive practical policy prescriptions. There is little doubt that our model is simplied, excludes
a whole host of important factors, and ignores potential limitations on the form and complexity
of IPR policies. Nevertheless, we believe that our results demonstrate a range of robust and
new e¤ects that should be further investigated in future work.
More generally, the analysis in this paper suggests that a move to a richer menu of IPR
policies, in particular, a move towards optimal state-dependent policies, may signicantly
increase innovation, economic growth and welfare. The results also show that the form of
optimal IPR policy may depend on the industry structure (and the technology of catch-up
within the industry). The next step in this line of research should be to investigate the
robustness of these e¤ects in di¤erent models of industry dynamics. It would also be useful to
study whether the relationship between the form of optimal IPR policy and industry structure
suggested by our analysis also applies when variation in industry structure has other sources
(for example, di¤erences in the extent of xed costs or demand structure causing di¤erential
gaps between technology leaders and followers across industries). The most important area for
future work is a detailed empirical investigation of the form of optimal IPR policy, using both
better estimates of the e¤ects of IPR policy on innovation rates and also structural models
that would enable the evaluation of the e¤ects of di¤erent policies on equilibrium growth and
welfare.
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Appendix: Proofs
Derivation of Optimal R&D Decisions in the Partial Equilibrium Model
Since the costs are linear, optimal R&D decisions imposed that, in equilibrium,
vn+1   vn = ; for each n 2 f 2; 1; 0; 1g : (50)
Combining this result with equation (1) gives the value of a two-step follower is
v 2 =
 2 + 22
r
:
The previous equation, together with (50) implies
vn = v 2 +  (n+ 2) =
 2 + 22
r
+  (n+ 2) , for each n 2 f 1; 0; 1; 2g : (51)
Now we can use the value of v2 to solve for x 2 from equation (1) : Similarly, combining (51) with (2)
gives the value of x 1; (51) with (3) gives x

0. Finally, combining (51) with (4) gives the equilibrium
value of x1: 
Derivation of Equation (27)
Fix the equilibrium R&D policies of other rms, x n (t), the equilibrium interest and wage rates, r
 (t)
and w (t), and equilibrium prots fn (t)g1n=1. Then the value of the rm that is n steps ahead at
time t can be written as:
Vn (t) = max
xn(t)
f[n (t)  w (t)G (xn (t))] t + o (t) (52)
+ exp ( r (t+ t) t)
266664
(xn (t) t+ o (t))Vn+1 (t+ t)
+
 
nt+ x

 n (t) t+ o (t)

V0 (t+ t)
+
 
1  xn (t) t  nt  x n (t) t  o (t)

Vn (t+ t)
377775
9>>>>=>>>>; :
The rst part of this expression is the ow prots minus R&D expenditures during a time interval
of length t. The second part is the continuation value after this interval has elapsed. Vn+1 (t) and
V0 (t) are dened as net present discounted values for a leader that is n + 1 steps ahead and a rm
in an industry that is neck-and-neck (i.e., n = 0). The second part of the expression uses the fact
that in a short time interval t, the probability of innovation by the leader is xn (t) t+ o (t), where
o (t) again denotes second-order terms. This explains the rst line of the continuation value. For the
remainder of the continuation value, note that the probability that the follower will catch up with the
leader is

n + x

 n (t)

t+ o (t). Finally, the last line applies when no R&D e¤ort is successful and
patents continue to be enforced, so that the technology gap remains at n steps. Now, subtract Vn (t)
from both sides, divide everything by t, and take the limit as t! 0 to obtain (27). 
Proof of Proposition 3
Equations (24) and (26) imply
Y (t) =
w (t)
! (t)
=
Q (t) 
P1
n=0 n

n(t)
! (t)
:
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Since ! (t) = ! and fng1n=0 are constant in steady state, Y (t) grows at the same rate as Q (t).
Therefore,
g = lim
t!0
lnQ (t+ t)  lnQ (t)
t
:
Now note the following: during an interval of length t (i) in the fraction n of the industries with
technology gap n  1 the leaders innovate at a rate xnt+o (t); (ii) in the fraction 0 of the industries
with technology gap of n = 0, both rms innovate, so that the total innovation rate is 2x0t+ o (t));
and (iii) each innovation increase productivity by a factor . Combining these observations, we have
lnQ (t+ t) = lnQ (t) + ln
"
20x

0t+
1X
n=1
nx

nt+ o (t)
#
:
Subtracting lnQ (t), dividing by t and taking the limit t! 0 gives (39). 
Proof of Proposition 4
We prove this proposition in four parts. (1) Existence of a steady-state equilibrium. (2) Properties of
the sequence of value functions. (3) Properties of the sequence of R&D decisions. (4) Uniqueness of an
invariant distribution given R&D policies.
Part 1: Existence of a Steady-State Equilibrium.
First, note that each xn belongs to a compact interval [0; x], where x is the maximal ow rate of
innovation dened in (16) above. Now x a labor share ~! 2 [0; 1] and a sequence h~xi of (Markovian)
steady-state strategies for all other rms in the economy, and consider the dynamic optimization problem
of a single rm. Our rst result characterizes this problem and shows that given some z h~!; ~xi, the
value function of an individual rm is uniquely determined, while its optimal R&D choices are given
by a convex-valued correspondence. In what follows, we denote sets and correspondences by uppercase
letters and refer to their elements by lowercase letters, e.g., xn (z) 2 Xn [z].
Lemma 1 Consider a uniform IPR policy uni, and suppose that the labor share and the R&D policies
of all other rms are given by z = h~!; ~xi. Then the dynamic optimization problem of an individual rm
leads to a unique value function v [z] : f 1g [ Z+ ! R+ and optimal R&D policy X^ [z] : f 1g [ Z+ 
[0; x] is compact and convex-valued for each z 2 Z and upper hemi-continuous in z (where v [z] 
fvn [z]g1n= 1 and X^ [z] 
n
X^n [z]
o1
n= 1
).
Proof. Fix z =


~!; f~xng1n= 1

, and consider the optimization problem of a representative rm,
written recursively as:
vn= max
xn2[0;x]
f 1   n  ~!G (xn) + xn [vn+1   vn] + ~x 1 [v0   vn] +  [v0   vn]g for n 2 N
v0 = max
x02[0;x]
f ~!G (x0) + x0 [v1   v0] + ~x0 [v 1   v0]g
v 1 = max
x 12[0;x]
f ~!G (x0) + x 1 [v0   v 1] +  [v0   v 1]g:
We now transform this dynamic optimization problem into a form that can be represented as a con-
traction mapping using the method of uniformization(see, for example, Ross, 1996, Chapter 5). Let
~ = f~xng1n= 1 and pn;n0

 j ~

be the probability that the next state will be n0 starting with state n
when the rm in question chooses policies  fxng1n= 1 and the R&D policy of other rms is given
by ~. Using the fact that, because of uniform IPR policy, x n = x 1 for all n 2 N, these transition
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probabilities can be written as:
p 1;0

 j ~

= x 1+xn+x 1+ pn;0

 j ~

= ~x 1+xn+~x 1+
p0; 1

 j ~

= ~x0x0+~x0 pn;n+1

 j ~

= xnxn+~x 1+
p0;1

 j ~

= x0x0+~x0
:
Uniformization involves adding ctitious transitions from a state into itself, which do not change the
value of the program, but allow us to represent the optimization problem as a contraction. For this
purpose, dene the transition rates  n as
 n

 j ~

=
8<: xn + x 1 +  for n 2 f1; 2; :::gx 1 +  for n =  1
2xn for n = 0
:
These transition rates are nite since  n

 j ~

   2x +  < 1 for all n, where x is the maximal
ow rate of innovation dened in (16) in the text (both x and  are nite by assumption).
Now following equation (5.8.3) in Ross (1996), we can use these transition rates and dene the new
transition probabilities (including the ctitious transitions from a state to itself) as:
~pn;n0

 j ~

=
8<:
 n(j~)
 pn;n0

 j ~

if n 6= n0
1   n(j~) if n = n0
:
This yields equivalent transition probabilities
~p 1; 1

 j ~

= 1  x 1+2x+ ~p 1;0

 j ~

= x 1+2x+ ~p0;1

 j ~

= x02x+
~p0; 1

 j ~

= ~x02x+ ~p0;0

 j ~

= 1  x0+~x02x+ ~pn;n+1

 j ~

= xn2x+
~pn;0

 j ~

= ~x 1+2x+ ~pn;n

 j ~

= 1  xn+~x 1+2x+
;
and also denes an e¤ective discount factor  given by
   
+  
=
2x+ 
+ 2x+ 
:
Also let the per period return function (prot net of R&D expenditures) be
^n (xn) =
(
1  n ~!G(xn)
+2x+ if n  1
 ~!G(xn)
+2x+ otherwise
: (53)
Using these transformations, the dynamic optimization problem can be written as:
vn = max
xn
(
^n (xn) + 
X
n0
~pn;n0

nj ~

~vn0
)
, for all n 2 Z; (54)
 T ~vn, for all n 2 Z:
where v fvng1n= 1 and the second line denes the operator T , mapping from the space of func-
tions V fv : f 1g [ Z+ ! R+g into itself. T is clearly a contraction mapping. The innovation
rates f~xng1n= 1 are upper hemi-continuous therefore ~p : f 1g [ Z+  f 1g [ Z+  [0; 1] is upper-
hemicontinuous and forms a multivalued stochastic kernel. Then Proposition 2.2 in Blume (1982)
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implies that ~p has the Feller property. Thus, for given z =


~!; f~xng1n= 1

, T possesses a unique xed
point v  fvng1n= 1 (e.g., Stokey, Lucas and Prescott, 1989).
Moreover, xn 2 [0; x], and vn for each n =  1; 0; 1; ::: given by the right-hand side of (54) is
continuous in xn, so Berges Maximum Theorem (Aliprantis and Border, 1999, Theorem 16.31, p. 539)
implies that the set of maximizers
n
X^n
o1
n= 1
exists, is nonempty and compact-valued for each z and is
upper hemi-continuous in z =


~!; f~xng1n= 1

. Moreover, concavity of vn in xn for each n =  1; 0; 1; :::
implies that
n
X^n
o1
n= 1
is also convex-valued for each z, completing the proof.
Now let us start with an arbitrary z h~!; ~xi 2 Z  [0; 1] [0; x]1. From Lemma 1, this z is mapped
into optimal R&D decision sets X^ [z], where x^n [z] 2 X^n [z]. From R&D policies ~x, we calculate
 [~x]fn [~x]g1n=0 using equations (35), (36) and (37). Then we can rewrite the labor market clearing
condition (38) as
! = min
( 1X
n=0
n

1
n
+G (~xn) ~! +G (~x n)

~!; 1
)
;
 ' (~!; ~x) (55)
where due to uniform IPR, x^ n = x^ 1 for all n > 0. Next, dene the mapping (correspondence)
 [z] 

' (z) ; X^ [z]

, which maps Z into itself, that is,
: Z Z: (56)
That  maps Z into itself follows since z 2 Z consists of ~x 2 [0; x]1 and ~! 2 [0; 1], and the image of
z under  consists of x^ 2 [0; x]1, and moreover, (55) is clearly in [0; 1] (since the right-hand side is
nonnegative and bounded above by 1). Finally, from Lemma 1, X^n [z] is compact and convex-valued
for each z 2 Z, and also upper hemi-continuous in z, and ' is continuous. Using this construction, we
can establish the existence of a steady-state equilibrium as follows.
We rst show that the mapping : Z Z constructed in (56) has a xed point, and then establish
that when G0 1
  
1   1 = (+ ) > 0 this xed point corresponds to a steady state with ! < 1.
First, it has already been established that  maps Z into itself. We next show that Z is compact in
the product topology and is a subset of a locally convex Hausdor¤ space. The rst part follows from
the fact that Z can be written as the Cartesian product of compact subsets, Z = [0; 1] Q1n= 1 [0; x].
Then by Tychono¤s Theorem (e.g., Aliprantis and Border, 1999, Theorem 2.57, p. 52; Kelley, 1955,
p. 143), Z is compact in the product topology. Moreover, Z is clearly nonempty and also convex, since
for any z; z0 2 Z and  2 [0; 1], we have z+ (1  ) z0 2 Z. Finally, since Z is a product of intervals on
the real line, it is a subset of a locally convex Hausdor¤ space (see Aliprantis and Border, 1999, Lemma
5.54, p. 192).
Next, ' is a continuous function from Z into [0; 1] and from Lemma 1, X^n (z) for n 2 f 1g [ Z+
is upper hemi-continuous in z. Consequently,  
D
' [z] ; X^ [z]
E
has closed graph in z in the product
topology. Moreover, each one of ' (z) and X^n (z) for n =  1; 0; ::: is nonempty, compact and convex-
valued. Therefore, the image of the mapping  is nonempty, compact and convex-valued for each
z 2 Z. The Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg Fixed Point Theorem implies that if the function  maps a
convex, compact and nonempty subset of a locally convex Hausdor¤ space into itself and has closed
graph and is nonempty, compact and convex-valued z, then it possesses a xed point z 2  (z) (see
Aliprantis and Border, 1999, Theorem 16.50 and Corollary 16.51, p. 549-550). This establishes the
existence of a xed point z of .
To complete the proof, we need to show that the xed point, z; corresponds to a steady state
equilibrium. First, since x^n
 
!; fxng1n= 1

= xn for n 2 f 1g [ Z+, we have that given a labor
share of !, fxng1n= 1 constitutes an R&D policy vector that is best response to itself, as required
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by steady-state equilibrium (Denition 3). Next, we need to prove that the implied labor share !
leads to labor market clearing. This follows from the fact that the xed point involves ! < 1, since
in this case (55) will have an interior solution, ensuring labor market clearing. Suppose, to obtain a
contradiction, that ! = 1. Then, as noted in the text, we must have 0 = 1. From (35), (36) and
(37), this implies xn = 0 for n 2 f 1g [ Z+. However, we have shown above that this is not possible
when G0 1
  
1   1 = (+ ) > 0. Consequently, (55) cannot be satised at ! = 1, implying that
! < 1. When ! < 1, the labor market clearing condition (38) is satised at ! as an equality, so ! is
an equilibrium given fxng1n= 1, and thus z =
 
!; fxng1n= 1

is a steady-state equilibrium as desired.
Finally, if  > 0, then (37) implies that 0 > 0. Since x

0 > 0, equation (39) implies g
 > 0.
Alternatively, if x 1 > 0, then g
 > 0 follows from (39). This completes the proof of the existence of a
steady-state equilibrium with positive growth.
Part 2: Properties of the Sequence of Value Functions.
Let fxng1n= 1 be the R&D decisions of the rm and fvng1n= 1 be the sequence of values, taking
the decisions of other rms and the industry distributions, fxng1n= 1, fng1n= 1, ! and g, as given.
By choosing xn = 0 for all n   1, the rm guarantees vn  0 for all n   1. Moreover, since ow
prot satisfy n  1 for all n   1, vn  1= for all n   1, establishing that fvng1n= 1 is a bounded
sequence, with vn 2 [0; 1=] for all n   1.
Proof of v1 > v0 : Suppose, rst, v1  v0, then (34) implies x0 = 0, and by the symmetry of the
problem in equilibrium (30) implies v0 = v1 = 0. As a result, from (33) we obtain x 1 = 0. Equation
(29) implies that when x 1 = 0, v1 
 
1   1 = (+ ) > 0, yielding a contradiction and proving that
v1 > v0. 
Proof of v 1  v0 : Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that v 1 > v0.
If v1  v0, (33) yields x 1 = 0. This implies v 1 = v0= (+ ), which contradicts v 1 > v0 since
= (+ ) < 1. Thus we must have v1 > v0. The value function of a neck-and-neck rm can be written
as:
v0 = max
x0
f !G (x0) + x0 [v1   v0] + x0 [v 1   v0]g ; (57)
 max
x0
f !G (x0) + x0 [v1   v0]g ;
  !G  x 1+ x 1 [v1   v0] ;
  !G  x 1+ x 1 [v0   v 1] +  [v0   v 1] ;
= v 1;
which contradicts the hypothesis that v 1 > v0 and establishes the claim. 
Proof of vn < vn+1 : Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that vn  vn+1. Now (32) implies xn = 0,
and (29) becomes
vn =
 
1   n+ x 1 [v0   vn] +  [v0   vn] (58)
Also from (29), the value for state n+ 1 satises
vn+1 
 
1   n 1+ x 1 [v0   vn+1] +  [v0   vn+1] : (59)
Combining the two previous expressions, we obtain 
1   n+ x 1 [v0   vn] +  [v0   vn]
 1   n 1 + x 1 [v0   vn+1] +  [v0   vn+1] :
Since  n 1 <  n, this implies vn < vn+1, contradicting the hypothesis that vn  vn+1, and es-
tablishing the desired result, vn < vn+1. Consequently, fvng1n= 1 is nondecreasing and fvng1n=0 is
(strictly) increasing. Since a nondecreasing sequence in a compact set must converge, fvng1n= 1 con-
verges to its limit point, v1, which must be strictly positive, since fvng1n=0 is strictly increasing and
has a nonnegative initial value. 
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The above results combined complete the proof that values form an increasing sequence. 
Part 3: Properties of the Sequence of R&D Decisions.
Proof of xn+1 < x

n: From equation (32),
n+1  vn+1   vn < vn   vn 1  n (60)
would be su¢ cient to establish that xn+1 < x

n whenever x

n > 0. We next show that this is the case.
Let us write:
vn = max
xn
 
1   n  !G (xn) + xn [vn+1   vn] + x 1v0 + v0	 ; (61)
where    + x 1 + . Since xn+1, xn and xn 1 are maximizers of the value functions vn+1, vn and
vn 1, (61) implies:
vn+1 = 1   n 1   !G
 
xn+1

+ xn+1 [vn+2   vn+1] + x 1v0 + v0;
(62)
vn  1   n   !G
 
xn+1

+ xn+1 [vn+1   vn] + x 1v0 + v0;
vn  1   n   !G
 
xn 1

+ xn 1 [vn+1   vn] + x 1v0 + v0;
vn 1 = 1   n+1   !G
 
xn 1

+ xn 1 [vn   vn 1] + x 1v0 + v0:
Now taking di¤erences with vn and using the denitions of ns, we obtain
n+1   n
 
1   1+ xn+1 (n+2   n+1)
n   n+1
 
1   1+ xn 1 (n+1   n) :
Therefore,  
+ xn 1

(n+1   n)   kn + xn+1 (n+2   n+1) ; (63)
where
kn  (  1)2  n 1 > 0:
Now to obtain a contradiction, suppose that n+1   n  0. From (63), this implies n+2   n+1 > 0
since kn is strictly positive. Repeating this argument successively, we have that if n0+1  n0  0, then
n+1   n > 0 for all n  n0. However, we know from Part 2 of the proposition that fvng1n=0 is strictly
increasing and converges to a constant v1. This implies that n # 0, which contradicts the hypothesis
that n+1   n  0 for all n  n0  0, and establishes that xn+1  xn. To see that the inequality is
strict when xn > 0, it su¢ ces to note that we have already established (60), i.e., n+1   n < 0, thus if
equation (32) has a positive solution, then we necessarily have xn+1 < x

n.
We next prove that x0  x 1 and then show that under the additional condition
G0 1
  
1   1 = (+ ) > 0, this inequality is strict.
Proof of x0  x 1 : Equation (30) can be written as
v0 =  !G (x0) + x0 [v 1 + v1   2v0] : (64)
We have v0  0 from Part 2 of the proposition. Suppose v0 > 0. Then (64) implies x0 > 0 and
v 1 + v1   2v0 > 0 (65)
v1   v0 > v0   v 1:
This inequality combined with (34) and (41) yields x0 > x

 1. Suppose next that v0 = 0. Inequality
(65) now holds as a weak inequality and implies that x0  x 1. Moreover, since G () is strictly convex
and x0 is given by (34), (64) then implies x

0 = 0 and thus x

 1 = 0.
We now have the following intermediate lemma.
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Lemma 2 Suppose that G0 1
  
1   1 = (+ ) > 0, then x0 > 0 and v0 > 0.
Proof. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that x0 = 0. The rst part of the proof then implies
that x 1 = 0. Then (29) implies
v1  1  +  [v0   v1] :
Equation (30) together with x0 = 0 gives v0 = 0, and hence
v1   v0  1  
 1
+ 
:
Combined with this inequality, (34) implies
x0  max

G0 1

1   1
! (+ )

; 0

;
 max

G0 1

1   1
+ 

; 0

;
where the second inequality follows from the fact that !  1. The assumption that
G0 1
  
1   1 = (+ ) > 0 then implies x0 > 0, thus leading to a contradiction and establishing
that x0 > 0. Strict convexity of G () together with x0 > 0 then implies v0 > 0.
Proof of x0 > x

 1 when G
0 1   1   1 = (+ ) > 0 : Given Lemma 2,
G0 1
  
1   1 = (+ ) > 0 implies that x0 > 0. Then (64) implies
v1   v0 > v0   v 1
and as a result x0 > x

 1. 
Proof of x0 > x

1 : To prove that x

0 > x

1, let us write the value functions v2; v1 and v0 as in (62):
v2 = 1   2   !G (x2) + x2 [v3   v2] + x 1v0 + v0;
v1  1   1   !G (x2) + x2 [v2   v1] + x 1v0 + v0;
v1  1   1   !G (x0) + x0 [v2   v1] + x 1v0 + v0;
v0 =  !G (x0) + x0 [v1   v0] + v0 + x 1v0 + x0 [v 1   v0] :
Now taking di¤erences with vn and using the denitions of ns as in (60), we obtain
2   1
 
1   1+ x2 (3   2) ; (66)
1 
 
1   1+ x0 (2   1) + x 1 [v0   v0]  x0 [v 1   v0] ;
1 
 
1   1+ x0 (2   1)  x0 [v 1   v0] ;
1 
 
1   1+ x0 (2   1)  x0 [v 1   v0] :
Next recall from Part 2 that v 1   v0  0. Moreover, the rst part of the rst part of the proof has
established that x 1 x0  0. Therefore

x 1   x0

[v 1   v0]  0, and the last inequality then implies
1 
 
1   1+ x0 (2   1) :
Now combining this inequality with the rst inequality of (66), we obtain
(+ x0) (2   1)   
 
1   12 + x2 (3   2) : (67)
Part 2 has already established 2 > 3, so that the right-hand side is strictly negative, therefore, we
must have 2   1 < 0, which implies that x0 > x1 and completes the proof. 
The above results together complete the proof of Part 3. 
Part 4: Uniqueness of the Invariant Distribution.
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Lemma 3 Consider a uniform IPR policy uni and a corresponding steady-state equilibrium
h; v; x; !; gi. Then, there exists n 2 N such that xn = 0 for all n  n.
Proof. The rst-order condition of the maximization of the value function (29) implies:
G0 (xn)  vn+1   vn
!
and xn  0,
with complementary slackness. G0 (0) is strictly positive by assumption. If (vn+1   vn) =! < G0 (0),
then xn = 0. The second part of the proposition implies that fvng1n= 1 is a convergent and thus a
Cauchy sequence, which implies that there exists 9n 2 N such that vn+1 vn < !G0 (0) for all n  n.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 3, combined with (35) is that n = 0 for all n  n (since
there is no innovation in industries with technology gap greater than n). Thus the law of motion of
an industry can be represented by a nite Markov chain. Moreover, because after an innovation by a
follower, all industries jump to the neck-and-neck state, this Markov chain is irreducible (and aperiodic),
thus converges to a unique steady-state distribution of industries. More formally, there exists n such
that xn = 0 and x

n = 0 for all n > n
. Combined with the fact G0 1
  
1   1 = (+ ) > 0 and
that either  > 0 or x 1 > 0, this implies that the states n > n
 are transient and can be ignored.
Consequently, fng1n=0 forms a nite and irreducible Markov chain over the states n = 0; 1; :::; n.
To see this, let n = minn2f0;:::;ng fn 2 N:vn+1   vn  !G0 (0)g. Such an n exists, since the set
f0; :::; ng is nite and nonempty because of the assumption that G0 1   1   1 = (+ ) > 0. Then
by construction xn > 0 for all n < n
 and xn = 0 as desired. Now denoting the probability of being in
state ~n starting in state n after  periods by P  (n; ~n), we have that lim!1 P  (n; ~n) = 0 for all ~n > n
and for all n. Thus we can focus on the nite Markov chain over the states n = 0; 1; :::; n, and fngn

n=0
is the limiting (invariant) distribution of this Markov chain. Given fxngn

n= 1, fngn

n=0 is uniquely
dened. Moreover, the underlying Markov chain is irreducible (since xn > 0 for n = 0; 1; :::; n
   1, so
that all states communicate with n = 0 or n = 1). Therefore, by Theorem 11.2 in Stokey, Lucas and
Prescott (1989, p. 62) there exists a unique stationary distribution fng1n=0. 
Proof of Proposition 5
We prove this proposition using two crucial lemmas.
Lemma 4 Consider the state-dependent IPR policy , and suppose that h; v; x; !; gi is a
steady-state equilibrium. Then there exists a state n 2 N such that n = 0 for all n  n.
Proof. There are two cases to consider. First, suppose that fvngn2Z+ is strictly increasing. Then
it follows from the proof of Lemma 3 that there exists a state n 2 N such that xn = 0 for all n  n,
and as in the proof of Part 4 of Proposition 4, states n  n are transient (i.e., lim!1 P  (n; ~n) = 0 for
all ~n > n and for all n), so n = 0 for all n  n.
Second, in contrast to the rst case, suppose that there exists some n 2 Z+ such that vn 
vn+1. Then, let n = minn2f0;:::;ng fn 2 N:vn+1   vn  !G0 (0)g, which is again well dened.
Then, optimal R&D decision (32) immediately implies that xn > 0 for all states with n < n
, and
since xn = 0, all states n > n
 are transient and lim!1 P  (n; ~n) = 0 for all ~n > n and for all n,
completing the proof.
Lemma 5 Consider the state-dependent IPR policy  and suppose that the labor share and the R&D
policies of all other rms are given by z = h~!; ~xi. Then the dynamic optimization problem of an individ-
ual rm leads to a unique value function v [z] : Z! R+ and optimal R&D policy X^ [z] : Z [0; x] are
compact and convex-valued for each z 2 Z and upper hemi-continuous in z (where v [z]  fvn [z]g1n= 1,
X^ [z] 
n
X^n [z]
o1
n= 1
).
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Proof. The proof follows closely that of Lemma 1. In particular, again using uniformization, the
maximization problem of an individual rm can be written as a contraction mapping similar to (54)
there. The niteness of the transition probabilities follows, since  n

 j ~

   2x+maxn fng <1
(this is a consequence of the fact that x dened in (16) is nite and maxn fng is nite, since each
n 2 R+ and by assumption, there exists n < 1 such that n = n). This contraction mapping
uniquely determines the value function v [z] : Z! R+.
Berges Maximum Theorem (Aliprantis and Border, 1999, Theorem 16.31, p. 539) again implies
that each of X^n (z) for n 2 Z is upper hemi-continuous in z = h~!; ~xi, and moreover, since vn for n 2 Z
is concave in xn, the maximizer of v [z], X^ 
n
X^n
o1
n= 1
, are nonempty, compact and convex-valued.
Now using the previous two lemmas, we can establish the existence of a steady-state equilib-
rium. This part of the proof follows that of Proposition 4 closely. Fix z =


~!; f~xng1n= 1

, and dene
Z  [0; 1] Q1n= 1 [0; x]. Again by Tychono¤s Theorem, Z is compact in the product topology. Then
consider the mapping : Z Z constructed as  

'; X^

, where ' is given by (55) and X^ is dened
in Lemma 5. Clearly  maps Z into itself. Moreover, as in the proof of Proposition 4, Z is nonempty,
convex, and a subset of a locally convex Hausdor¤ space. The proof of Lemma 5 then implies that  has
closed graph in the product topology and is nonempty, compact and convex-valued in z. Consequently,
the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg Fixed Point Theorem again applies and implies that  has a xed point
z 2  (z). The argument that the xed point z corresponds to a steady-state equilibrium is identical
to that in Proposition 4, and follows from the fact that within argument identical to that of Lemma
2, G0 1
  
1   1 = (+ 1) > 0 implies x0 > 0. The result that ! < 1 then follows immediately.
Finally, as in the proof of Proposition 4, either 1 > 0 or x

 1 > 0 is su¢ cient for g
 > 0. 
49
References
Acemoglu, Daron and Ufuk Akcigit (2006) State-Dependent Intellectual Property
Right PolicyNBER working paper, No. 12775.
Aghion, Philippe, Nick Bloom, Richard Blundell, Rachel Gri¢ th and Peter
Howitt (2005) Competition and Innovation: an Inverted-U Relationship,Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, 120, pp. 701-728.
Aghion, Philippe and Rachel Gri¢ th (2007) Competition and Growth: Reconciling
Theory and Evidence, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Aghion, Philippe, Christopher Harris, Peter Howitt and John Vickers (2001)
Competition, Imitation and Growth with Step-by-Step Innovation, Review of Economic
Studies, 68, pp. 467-492 .
Aghion, Philippe, Christopher Harris and John Vickers (1997) Step-by-step
Competition, Innovation and Growth: An Example, European Economic Review, 41, pp.
771-782.
Aghion, Philippe and Peter Howitt (1992) A Model of Growth Through Creative
Destruction,Econometrica, 110, 323-351.
Aliprantis, Charalambos D. and Kim C. Border (1999) Innite Dimensional Analy-
sis: Hitchhikers Guide, Springer-Verlag, New York.
Almeida, Rita and Ana Margarida Fernandes (2008). Openness and Technological
Innovations in Developing Countries: Evidence from Firm-Level Surveys, The Journal of
Development Studies, 44(5), 701-727.
Arrow, Kenneth (1962) Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inven-
tion, in R.R. Nelson, ed. Universities-National Bureau of Economic Research Conference
Series; The Rate and Direction of Economic Activities: Economic and Social Factors, Prince-
ton University Press, New York.
Baye, Michael R., and Heidrun C. Hoppe (2003) The Strategic Equivalence of
Rent-seeking, Innovation, and Patent-race Games,Games and Economic Behavior, 44, 217-
226.
Bloom, Nick, Mark Schankerman and John Van Reenen (2005) Identifying Tech-
nology Spillovers and Product Rivalry,CEP Discussion Paper, No. 675.
Blume, Lawrence E. (1982) New Techniques for the Study of Stochastic Equilibrium
Processes,Journal of Mathematical Economics, 9, 61-70.
Boldrin, Michele and David K. Levine (2008) Perfectly Competitive Innovation,
50
Journal of Monetary Economics, 55, 435-453.
Boldrin, Michele and David K. Levine (2004) IP and Market Size,Univesity of
Minnesota and UCLA mimeo.
Budd, Christopher, Christopher Harris and John Vickers (1993) A Model of the
Evolution of Duopoly: Does the Asymmetry Between Firms Tend to Increase or Decrease?
Review of Economic Studies, 60, 540-573.
Bureau of Economic Analysis (2004) Annual Revision of the National In-
come and Product Accounts Bureau of Economic Analysis News. BEA 04-31.
www.bea.gov/bea/rels.htm
Choi, Jay P. (1991) Dynamic R&D Competition under Hazard Rate Uncertainty,
Rand Journal of Economics, 22, 596-610.
Fudenberg, Drew, Richard Gilbert, Joseph Stiglitz and Jean Tirole (1983) Pre-
emption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races,European Economic Review 22, 3-31.
Fullerton, Robert and Preston McAfee (1999) Auctioning Entry into Tourna-
ments,Journal of Political Economy, 107, 573-605.
Gallini, Nancy T. (1992) Patent Policy and Costly Imitation, RAND Journal of
Economics, 23, 52-63.
Gallini, Nancy T. and Suzanne Scotchmer (2002) Intellectual Property; When is
it the Best Incentive Mechanism?Innovation Policy and the Economy, 2, 51-78.
Gilbert, Richard. and Carl Shapiro (1990) Optimal Patent Length and Breadth,
Journal of Industrial Economics, 21(1), 106-112.
Green, Jerry and Suzanne Scotchmer (1995) On the Division of Prot in Sequential
Innovation,Journal of Industrial Economics, 26(1), 20-33.
Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (1990) Innovation and Growth in the Global
Economy, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Hall, Bronwyn H., Jerry Hausman and Zvi Griliches (1988) Patents and R&D:
Is There a Lag? International Economic Review, 27, pp. 265-83.
Harris, Christopher and John Vickers (1985) Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of
Race,Review of Economic Studies, 52, 193-209.
Harris, Christopher and John Vickers (1987) Racing with Uncertainty,Review of
Economic Studies, 54, 1-21.
Hopenhayn, Hugo and Matthew Mitchell (2001) Innovation, Variety and Patent
Breadth,RAND Journal of Economics, 32, 152-166.
51
Hopenhayn, Hugo and Matthew Mitchell (2011) Optimal Patent Policy with Re-
current Innovators,mimeo.
Hugo Hopenhayn, Llobet, Gerard and Matthew Mitchell (2006) Rewarding
Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts,Journal of Political Economy, 114, 1041-
1068.
Judd, Kenneth (1999) Numerical Methods in Economics, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Kelley, John L. (1955) General Topology, Springer-Verlag, New York.
Klemperer, Paul (1990) How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?Jour-
nal of Industrial Economics, 21, 113-130.
Kremer, Michael (2002). Pharmaceuticals and the Developing World, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 16(4), 67-90.
Kortum, Samuel (1993) Equilibrium R&D and the Patent-R&D Ratio: US Evidence,
American Economic Review, 83, pp. 450-457.
Lanjouw, Jean O and Mark Schankerman (2001) Enforcing Intellectual Property
Rights,NBER Working Paper, No. 8656.
Moscarini, Giuseppe and Francesco Squintani (2004) Competitive Experimenta-
tion with Private Information,Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper, No. 1489.
Moser, Petra and Alessandra Voena (2011) Evidence from the Trading with the
Enemy Act, American Economic Review, forthcoming.
National Science Foundation (2006) Industrial R&D Employment in the United
States and in U.S. Multinational CorporationsDivision of Science Resource Statistics. NSF
05-302. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation. www.bsf.gov/sbe/srs/stats.htm
ODonoghue, Ted, Suzanne Scotchmer and Jacques François Thisse (1998)
Patent Breadth, Patent Life and the Pace of Technological Progress,Journal of Economics
and Management Strategy, 7, 1-32.
ODonoghue, Ted and Joseph Zweimuller (2004) Patents in a Model of Endogenous
Growth,Journal of Economic Growth, 9, 81-123.
Pakes, Ariel and Zvi Griliches (1980) Patents and R&D at the Firm Level: A First
Look,Economic Letters, 5, pp. 377-381.
Quah, Danny (2004) 24/7 Competitive Innovation,LSE Mimeo.
Reinganum, Jennifer (1981) Dynamic Games of Innovation, Journal of Economic
Theory, 25, 21-24.
Reinganum, Jennifer (1985) Innovation and Industry Evolution,Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 100, 81-100.
52
Romer, Paul M. (1990) Endogenous Technological Change,Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 98, S71-S102.
Ross, Sheldon (1996) Stochastic Processes, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Scotchmer, Suzanne (1999) On the Optimality of the Patent System, The Rand
Journal of Economics, 30, 181-196.
Scotchmer, Suzanne (2005) Innovations and Incentives, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts.
Segal, Ilya and Michael Whinston (2007) Anti-Trust in Innovative Industries,
American Economic Review, 97, 1703-1730.
Tandon, Pankaj (1982) Optimal Patents with Compulsory Licensing,Journal of Po-
litical Economy 90(3), 470-486.
Taylor, Curtis (1995) Digging for Golden Carrots: An Analysis of Research Tourna-
ments,American Economic Review, 85, 872-890.
Tirole, Jean (1988) The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
Stokey, Nancy (1995) R&D and Economic GrowthReview of Economic Studies, 62,
pp. 469-489.
Stokey, Nancy and Robert Lucas with E. Prescott (1989) Recursive Methods in
Economic Dynamics, Harvard University Press.
53
Tables
Note: Tables 1-5 give the results of the numerical computations with  = 0:05 under three di¤erent IPR
policy regimes. Tables 1-4 consider a di¤erent environment (quick catch-up, slow catch-up, licensing
and leapfrogging) at a time, whereas Table 5 combines the latter three environments (slow catch-up,
licensing and leapfrogging). Table 6 reports the robustness checks of the state-dependent results of
Table 5 with alternative step sizes and R&D elasticity parameters. Depending on the applicability and
necessity, Tables 1-6 report the steady-state equilibrium values of the di¤erence in the values v1 v 3
and v0 v 3; the (annual) catch-up and frontier R&D rates of a follower that is one step behind,
(xc 1; x
f
 1); the (annual) R&D rate of neck-and-neck competitors, x

0; the (annual) R&D rate of one-
step leader, x1; fraction of industries in neck-and-neck competition, 0; fraction of industries at a
technology gap of n = 1; 2; the value of labor share, !; the ratio of the labor force working in
research; log of initial (annual) consumption, lnC(0); the annual growth rate, g; and the welfare level
according to equation (42). It also reports the welfare-maximizing uniform and state-dependent IPR
policies. See text for details.
 = 1:05;  = 0:35;
B = 0:1
Full IPR
Optimal
Uniform IPR
Optimal
State-dependent IPR
1 0 0 0.71
2 0 0 0.08
3 0 0 0
4 0 0 0
5 0 0 0
x 1 0.22 0.22 0.12
x0 0.35 0.35 0.25
x1 0.29 0.29 0.41
0 0.24 0.24 0.46
1 0.33 0.33 0.19
2 0.20 0.20 0.13
! 0.95 0.95 0.96
Researcher ratio 0.032 0.032 0.028
lnC (0) 33.78 33.78 34.20
g 0.0186 0.0186 0.0204
Welfare 683.0 683.0 692.1
Table 1. Optimal Patent Length in Quick Catch-up Regime
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 = 1:05;  = 0:35
B = 0:1; n =1; #n =1 Full IPR
Optimal
Uniform IPR
Optimal
State-dependent IPR
1 0.02 0.11 0.69
2 0.02 0.11 0.20
3 0.02 0.11 0.14
4 0.02 0.11 0.12
5 0.02 0.11 0.08
x 1 0.75 0.27 0.17
x0 0.99 0.14 0.32
x1 1.10 0.15 0.51
0 0.02 0.16 0.30
1 0.03 0.19 0.15
2 0.03 0.14 0.10
! 0.56 0.90 0.90
Researcher ratio 0.150 0.055 0.059
lnC (0) 31.31 34.31 34.57
g 0.025 0.023 0.025
Welfare 636.3 695.3 701.2
Table 2. Optimal Patent Length in Slow Catch-up Regime
 = 1:05;  = 0:35
B = 0:1; n = 0:02; #n =1 Full IPR
Optimal
Uniform IPR
Optimal
State-dependent IPR
1 1 1.61 0
2 1 1.61 1.54
3 1 1.61 2.45
4 1 1.61 2.92
5 1 1.61 3.32
v0   v 3 10.1 2.9 3.2
x 1 0.75 0.27 0.31
x0 0.99 0.39 0.45
x1 1.10 0.43 0.46
0 0.02 0.21 0.18
1 0.03 0.25 0.20
2 0.03 0.20 0.12
! 0.56 0.94 0.91
Researcher ratio 0.150 0.043 0.071
lnC (0) 31.31 34.13 34.47
g 0.025 0.021 0.025
Welfare 636.3 690.9 699.3
Table 3. Licensing in Slow Catch-up Regime
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 = 1:05;  = 0:35
B = 0:1; n = 0:02; n =1 Full IPR
Optimal
Uniform IPR
Optimal
State-dependent IPR
#1 1 14 0
#2 1 14 18.1
#3 1 14 31.3
#4 1 14 36.6
#5 1 14 43.7
v1   v 3 21.4 2.7 4.1
xc 1 0.75 0.15 0.14
xf 1 0 0.23 0.33
x0 0.99 0.30 0.29
x1 1.10 0.30 0.39
0 0.02 0.14 0.12
1 0.03 0.42 0.35
2 0.03 0.22 0.17
! 0.56 0.95 0.94
Researcher ratio 0.150 0.028 0.058
lnC (0) 31.31 35.48 36.17
g 0.025 0.026 0.031
Welfare 636.3 720.0 735.9
Table 4. Leapfrogging in Slow Catch-up Regime
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 = 1:05;  = 0:35
B = 0:1
Full IPR
Optimal
Uniform IPR
Optimal
State-dependent IPR
1 0.02 0 0
2 0.02 0 0
3 0.02 0 0
4 0.02 0 0
5 0.02 0 0
1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1
3 1 1 1
4 1 1 1
5 1 1 1
#1 1 16.6 0
#2 1 16.6 21.7
#3 1 16.6 34.6
#4 1 16.6 39.4
#5 1 16.6 51.3
v1   v 3 21.4 3.1 4.6
v0   v 3 10.1 0.8 2.7
xc 1 0.75 0.16 0.16
xf 1 0 0.23 0.34
x0 0.99 0.32 0.29
x1 1.10 0.32 0.41
0 0.02 0.11 0.36
1 0.03 0.41 0.17
2 0.03 0.22 0.10
! 0.56 0.94 0.94
Researcher ratio 0.150 0.031 0.065
lnC (0) 31.31 35.62 36.38
g 0.025 0.027 0.033
Welfare 636.3 723.0 740.5
Table 5. All Three Policies in Slow Catch-up Regime
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 = 0:1
Optimal
State-
dependent
IPR
 = 0:1
B = 0:04
Optimal
State-
dependent
IPR
 = 0:6
B = 0:2
Optimal
State-
dependent
IPR
 = 1:01
B = 0:35
Optimal
State-
dependent
IPR
 = 1:20
B = 0:024
1 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1
3 1 1 1 1
4 1 1 1 1
5 1 1 1 1
#1 0 0 3.6 0
#2 16.7 12.6 5.5 33.4
#3 35.6 20.0 8.9 82.3
#4 44.8 23.0 12.3 100.7
#5 54.0 32.9 15.8 128.7
v1   v 3 4.1 4.0 1.3 17.5
v0   v 3 2.6 1.6 0.8 5.2
xc 1 0.23 0.06 0.69 0.02
xf 1 0.28 0.61 0.88 0.10
x0 0.27 0.42 0.97 0.10
x1 0.29 0.98 1.24 0.10
0 0.20 0.01 0.10 0.06
1 0.47 0.15 0.26 0.48
2 0.19 0.09 0.11 0.22
! 0.95 0.90 0.97 0.11
Researcher ratio 0.011 0.161 0.048 0.087
lnC (0) 36.08 37.54 13.80 118.35
g 0.027 0.044 0.026 0.035
Welfare 732.4 768.3 286.3 2381.2
Table 6. All Three Policies in Slow Catch-up Regime - Robustness Checks
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